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PRESERVING THE INTEGRITY OF MEDIATION
THROUGH THE ADOPTION OF ETHICAL RULES
FOR LAWYER-MEDIATORS
MAUREEN E. LAFLIN*
INTRODUCTION
As mediation has grown in popularity over the past few
decades as an alternative to costly and protracted litigation,1 a
whole new field of professional ethics-mediation ethics-has
emerged. The ethical issues that fall within this field are many
and diverse, ranging from fact-specific questions of confidential-
ity, competence, and conflicts of interest to abstract inquiries
into the very nature and scope of mediation as a practice.
While many of these ethical issues are germane to all
mediators, a unique and problematic set of issues arises for those
mediators who are concurrently licensed or certified practition-
ers within another profession. These "cross-profession" practi-
tioners-psychologist-mediators, social worker-mediators, lawyer-
mediators-must abide by the rules or standards of conduct for
both professions. Oftentimes, these rules conflict or, by their
silence, provide no guidance for practitioners attempting to navi-
gate between them cleanly and without shipwreck.
Nowhere is cross-professionalism as problematic as it is for
lawyer-mediators.2 In part, this results from direct conflict
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1. See Barbara McAdoo & Nancy Welsh, Does ADR Really Have a Place on the
Lawryer's Philosophical Map?, 18 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 376 (1997) (noting
that many lawyers use mediation under the belief that it reduces the cost of
litigation by encouraging early settlement); but seeJAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., JUST,
SPEEDY, AND INEXPENSIVE? AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT
UNDER THE CrVLJUSTICE REFORM ACT 20 (1996) (arguing that empirical studies
suggest that mediation programs do not reduce cost and delay).
2. Much has been written about cross-professional practice and the ethi-
cal dilemma lawyers confront when the rules governing lawyers' professional
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between lawyer rules of professional conduct and the ethical obli-
gations faced by mediators. Lawyers, for example, must report
attorney misconduct,' yet a lawyer-mediator who discloses attor-
ney wrongdoing that comes to his or her attention during a
mediation potentially breaches the obligation of confidentiality
that is central to the mediation process.4 A second reason why
cross-professionalism is particularly vexing for lawyer-mediators is
the close relationship between the practice of law and media-
tion.5 Most mediations concern disputes that could alternatively
be handled through traditional legal processes. Many media-
tions are court-connected. Lawyer-mediators therefore often
find themselves straddling their two professions. Sometimes, as
when a party to a mediation seeks to secure legal representation
from the lawyer-mediator subsequent to the close of a mediation,
the lawyer-mediator may find that the closeness of the two prac-
tices becomes an ethical snare.6
Yet the greatest source of difficulty concerning the cross-
practice of law and mediation is not the closeness of the two
practices, but their fundamental differences. Law is an adver-
sarial process that by design creates winners and losers; media-
tion is paradigmatically a facilitative process, whereby the parties
strive to achieve a voluntary agreement that resolves the dispute
conduct and the ethical rules for mediators conflict. See, e.g., Robert A. Baruch
Bush, The Dilemmas of Mediation Practice: A Study of Ethical Dilemmas and Policy
Implications, 1994 J. DisP. RESOL. 1, 3, reprinted in DWIGHT GOLANN, MEDIATING
LEGAL DIsPUTEs: EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES FOR LAWYERS AND MEDIATORS ch. 14
(1996); Judith Maute, Public Values and Private Justice: A Case for Mediator
Accountability, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 503 (1991) (arguing that the Rules of
Professional Conduct should be amended to add a new rule dealing with lawyer
mediation).
3. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3 (1997); Mori
Irvine Sub, Serving Two Masters: The Obligation Under the Rules of Professional Con-
duct to Report Attorney Misconduct in a Confidential Mediation, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 155
(1994).
4. See In re Waller, 573 A.2d 780 (D.C. 1990) (per curiam).
5. Lawyers and successful mediators share many skills and attributes and
thus are frequently called upon to serve as mediators especially in court-con-
nected civil mediations. See Sub, supra note 3, at 155.
6. See NANCY H. ROGERS & CRAIG McEWEN, MEDIATION: LAw, POLICY &
PRACTICE § 10:02 (2d ed. 1994) (illustrating the range of ethical restrictions
placed on mediators' subsequent representation of parties to mediation);
Michael Moffitt, Loyalty, Confidentiality and Attorney-Mediators: Professional Respon-
sibility in Cross-Professional Practice, 1 HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 203(1996)
(arguing that issues raised in Poly Software Int'l Inc. v. Su, 880 F. Supp. 1487 (D.
Utah 1995), underscore the need for the legal profession to adopt standards of
conduct to address situations when lawyers practice law and serve as mediators).
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to at least the partial satisfaction of all.7 This fundamentally dif-
ferent practice-orientation gives rise to the principal ethical issue
that emerges when lawyers, trained as advocates and problem-
solvers, serve as mediators-that of preserving the integrity of the
mediation process as a forum where an impartial third party
assists the participants in resolving their own disputes.' This
problem, often framed as the dilemma between facilitative and
evaluative styles of mediation,9 is an issue of power, domination,
and control over the ultimate resolution of the dispute. The cen-
tral ethical issue concerning lawyers as mediators, in other words,
goes to whether the disputants arrive at the resolution of their
dispute by their own self-determination or under the evaluative
direction and control of the mediator.' 0
In this paper, I argue for ethical rules for lawyer-mediators
that meaningfully address this issue of power and control.'1 In
7. See Fiona Furlan et al., Ethical Guidelines for Attorney-Mediators: Are Attor-
neys Bound By Ethical Codes For Lawyers When Acting As Mediators ?, 14 J. AM. ACAD.
MATRIMONIAL LAw 267, 269 (1997) ("In contrast to the adversarial process for
resolving disputes, the goal of mediation is that both parties should leave the
mediation with a solution to which they have contributed and by which they can
abide.").
8. Lawyers owe a duty of loyalty to their clients. See MODEL RuLEs OF PRO-
FESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 cmt. (1997) ("Loyalty is an essential element in
the lawyer's relationship to a client."); Moffitt, supra note 6, at 206. In contrast,
lawyer-mediators owe a duty of loyalty to the process. See COMMISSION ON ETH-
ICS MODEL RuLE, infra note 12, at 2 ("Lawyer neutrals do not 'represent' parties,
but have a duty to be fair to all participants in the process and to execute differ-
ent obligations and responsibilities with respect to the parties and to the pro-
cess."). See also Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Informed Consent in Mediation: A
Guiding Principle for Truly Educated Decisionmaking, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 775,
826 (1999) ("Unlike physicians and attorneys, who owe a direct fiduciary duty
to their patients and clients, respectively, the mediator is said to represent the
integrity of the mediation process and it is in this sense then that the mediator
has a special fiduciary relationship with both parties to a dispute.").
9. See Symposium, Standards of Professional Conduct in Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 1995J. Disp. RESOL. 95, 106-08 (comments ofJohn Feerick).
10. SeeJames H. Stark, Preliminary Reflections on the Establishment of a Media-
tion Clinic, 2 CLINICAL L. REv. 457, 503 (1996) ("Of all the ethical questions that
arise in mediation, none is more central to the mediator's role, or more vigor-
ously contested, than the 'neutrality vs. fairness' debate.").
11. Several others have written about the need for ethical rules for lawyer-
mediators. See, e.g., Maute, supra note 2 (arguing that the Rules of Professional
Conduct should be amended to add a new rule dez-fing with lawyer mediation);
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution: New Issues, No
Answers From the Adversary Conception of Lawyers' Responsibilities, 38 S. TEX. L. REV.
407, 418 (1997) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion] ("ADR now needs 'ethics' or standards in part because of its successes
... ."); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Is Mediation the Prac:ice of Law?, 14 ALTERNATwES
TO HIGH COST LITIG. 57 (1996) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Is Mediation the
Practice of Law?] (questioning whether ADR ethics are subject to lawyer's ethical
2000]
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general, three rule-making alternatives exist for regulating the
cross-practice of lawyer-mediators. One alternative is to treat
mediations conducted by lawyers as a form of legal service falling
within the purview of traditional lawyer rules of professional con-
duct. A second alternative, which I call the "Umbrella
Approach," involves regulating all mediators as a general class
regardless of professional training or affiliation. Third, ethical
rules can be crafted which specifically target the cross-practice of
law and mediation.
I argue in favor of the third "Targeted Rule" alternative.
Specific ethical rules for lawyer-mediators are needed to preserve
the integrity of mediation as a process distinct from law. Rules of
professional conduct crafted for lawyers-qua-lawyers reflect the
adversarial nature of the law and encourage responsible advocacy
and representation. These foci, while central to good lawyering,
stand juxtaposed to the role of the mediator as an impartial neu-
tral who represents no party but only, if anything, the mediation
process itself. Standards designed for mediators as a general
class, while obviously sympathetic to the facilitative nature of
mediation, cannot adequately confront the cross-professional
problems associated with any particular group of mediators.
Only rules targeting lawyer-mediators directly-rules, that is,
designed from a perspective of conscious awareness of the pro-
fessional predisposition of many lawyer-mediators to exert power
and control over the outcome of a mediation-offer any true
prospect of combating this troublesome aspect of the cross-pro-
fessional practice of mediation by lawyers.
As models for the type of targeted rules that are needed, I
will discuss a pair of recent rule-making efforts aimed at clarify-
ing the roles, responsibilities, and ethical obligations of those
engaged in the cross-practice of law and mediation. In April
standards); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Many Ways of Mediation: The Transfor-
mation of Traditions, Ideologies, Paradigms, and Practices, 11 NEGOTIATION J. 217
(1995) (providing a cogent overview of models of mediation practice and the
ethical issues raised); Moffitt, supra note 6 (arguing that Poly Software high-
lighted the cross-professional practice problems and the need for the bar to
adopt standards of conduct for lawyer-mediators); Alison Smiley, Professional
Codes and Neutral Lauryering: An Emerging Standard Governing Nonrepresentational
Attorney Mediation, 7 GEo.J. LEGAL ETHICS 213 (1993) (advocating adoption of a
single ethical standard which would recognize the role of the neutral attorney
mediator). The adoption of such rules has become necessary since the growth
and success of mediation as a dispute resolution method has propelled it to that
stage in the natural development of a profession where the adoption of rules of
conduct becomes necessary. See MAcALi LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM:
A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 60-71, 166-77 (1977);Jack R. Frymier, Professionalism
in Context, 26 OHIO ST. L.J. 53, 53-54, 56-58 (1965).
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1999, the CPR-Georgetown Commission on Ethics and Standards
in ADR released its draft Proposed Model Rule of Professional Conduct
for the Lawyer as Third Party Neutral.12 Effective January 1, 2000,
Virginia became the first state to adopt Rules of Professional
Conduct for lawyers that unequivocally and specifically address
the conduct of lawyers acting as third party neutrals and
mediators.13 While not perfect solutions, these codification
efforts mark a significant breakthrough in the regulation of law-
yer-mediators. Before examining them, however, we should con-
sider in greater detail the problem of power and control that
threatens to engulf mediation, as well as the shortcomings that
attend using either of the first two regulatory alternatives.
I. THE EVALUATIVE THREAT TO MEDIATION PRACTICE
A. The Evaluative/Facilitative Debate
The problem of lawyer-mediators exerting too much control
over the conduct and resolution of a mediation typically is
presented as a debate over mediation styles-facilitative versus
evaluative. Historically, this debate has no precedent. Prior to its
recent growth and expansion in law-related cases, mediation was
viewed as a wholly facilitative process separate and distinct from
adjudication. 4 Even today, many scholars and theoreticians con-
tinue to characterize mediation in this classical sense as a process
whereby the mediator, who has no stake or power over the out-
come, helps the parties identify and evaluate their interests and
options as they proceed, ever independent of the mediator's con-
trol, to design and craft their own agreement.' 5 The hallmark of
12. PROPOSED MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE LAWYER AS
THIRD PARTY NEUTRAL (CPR-Georgetown Comm'n on Ethics and Standards in
ADR, Proposed Draft 1999) [hereinafter, COMMISSION ON ETHICS MODEL RULE].
13. See VIRGINIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 2.10, 2.11 (1999).
The new Rules of Professional Conduct replace the Virginia Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility.
14. See, e.g., Lon Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L.
REv. 305 (1971); Douglas Lind, On the Theory and Practice of Mediation: The Con-
tribution of Seventeenth-Century Jurisprudence, 10 MEDIATION Q. 119 (1992); but cf
ROGERS & McEWEN, supra note 6, at § 5.01 (discussing the special character of
labor mediation throughout much of the twentieth century).
15. See, e.g., James J. Alfini, Evaluative Versus Facilitative Mediation: A Dis-
cussion, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 919 (1997) [hereinafter Alfini, Evaluative Versus
Facilitative Mediation]; James J. Alfini, Trashing, Bashing and Hashing It Out: Is
This the End of "Good Mediation?", 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 47 (1991) [hereinafter
Alfini, Trashing Bashing and Hashing It Out]; Kimberlee K. Kovach, What is Real
Mediation, and Who Should Decide?, 3 Disp. RESOL. MAC. 5 (1996); Kimberlee K.
Kovach & Lela P. Love, "Evaluative" Mediation is an Oxymoron, 14 ALTERNATrVES
TO HIGH COST LITIG. 31 (1996) [hereinafter Kovach & Love, Evaluative Media-
2000]
484 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 14
mediation in this sense is the self-determination of the parties16
and the impartiality of the mediator.' 7 On this classical model,
the role of the mediator has been said, quite rightly, to resemble
that of a Sherpa guide. 8
Yet as mediation has grown in popularity, and especially as
the practice has become increasingly intertwined with the legal
system, this theoretical model has begun to unravel. In practice,
many mediators deviate from the Sherpa guide ideal. Today,
mediators often provide legal information or advice.' 9 At times,
they apply the law as they know it to the facts at issue and predict
the likely outcome should the mediation dissolve and end up in
court. As the giving of information, advice, and predictions has
increased, mediation as a practice has moved further and further
tion]; Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, Mapping Mediation: The Risks of Ris-
kin's Grid, 3 HARv. NEGOTIATION L. REv. 71 (1998) [hereinafter Kovach & Love,
Mapping Mediation]; Lela Love, The Top Ten Reasons Why Mediators Should Not
Evaluate, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 937 (1997). I discuss these writers infra notes 46-
56, 88-89 and accompanying text.
16. SeeJoiNT STANDARDS OF CONDUCr FOR MEDIATORS Standard I (1994)
("Self-determination is the fundamental principle of mediation. It requires
that the mediation process rely on the ability of the parties to reach a voluntary,
uncoerced agreement. Any party may withdraw from mediation at any time.").
17. See id. Standard II ("The concept of mediator impartiality is central to
the mediation process. A mediator shall mediate only those matters in which
she or he can remain impartial and evenhanded. If at any time the mediator is
unable to conduct the process in an impartial manner, the mediator is obli-
gated to withdraw.").
18. Sub writes:
A mediator can be envisioned as the Sherpa guide of the negotiation
process. A Sherpa guide does not tell explorers which mountain to
climb, or whether to climb a mountain; rather, once the explorers
decide to climb a mountain, the Sherpa guide helps the expedition
find the best way up to the top. Similarly, a mediator does not tell the
parties when or how to settle a case, but will help the parties maneuver
towards resolution.
Sub, supra note 3, at 158 n.13.
19. Some make a distinction between giving legal advice and legal infor-
mation. See, e.g., Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Court Mediation and the Search for
Justice Through Law, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 47 (1996) (arguing that mediators should
refrain from using legal knowledge to analyze issues and predict probable court
outcomes). Sandra E. Purnell claims that mediators who provide legal informa-
tion are not practicing law because the parties do not reasonably believe that
the mediator is their representative. See Sandra E. Purnell, The Attorney As Medi-
ator-Inherent Conflict of Interest, 32 UCLA L. REv. 986 (1985). Purnell argues
for the development of guidelines which allow attorney-mediators to provide
legal information but not legal advice. See id. Others argue that the distinctions
are too nebulous. See, e.g., Donald T. Weckstein, In Praise of Party Empower-
ment-and of Mediator Activism, 33 WILLArME=rrE L. Rxv. 501, 544 (1997) (noting
that "the distinction between information and advice has been criticized as too
vague to guide mediator behavior clearly").
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from the facilitative ideal, looking at times no different from neu-
tral case evaluation or settlement conferencing.
This transformation in the practice of mediation has
become particularly acute with the dramatic increase in lawyers
acting as mediators and in referring matters for mediation.2 °
Several factors have contributed to these changes in mediation
practice brought about or at least accelerated by its increasing
connection with the legal system. These factors include the close
relationship between law and mediation,21 the growth of court-
connected mediation,22 the increase in mediations involving
20. See Kovach & Love, Mapping Mediation, supra note 15, at 92 ("Two
factors have driven the mutation of mediation: rapid expansion of court-con-
nected and lawyer-dominated programs and the failure of courts to distinguish
among ADR process options."). "Many practicing mediators have an evaluative
orientation. Yet most trainers, teachers, and professors don't teach evaluation
as a permissible component of meditation. The courts and the legal commu-
nity are largely responsible for this paradox." Kovach & Love, Evaluative Media-
tion, supra note 15, at 31.
21. The connection is best seen in the current certification requirements
adopted by the federal courts and by many states. Most federal district courts
and at least eight states require that mediators in civil cases be licensed attor-
neys. See ELIZABETH PLAPINGER & DONNA STIENSTRA, ADR AND SETTLEMENT IN
THE FEDERAL DIsTRIcr COURTS: A SOURCE BOOK FOR JUDGES AND LAWYERS
(1996) (surveying the rules, including some ethical requirements, of current
ADR and settlement procedures in the 94 federal district courts). The states
include: Delaware, see 6 DEL. CODE ANN. § 7708 (1998), Florida, see FLA. R. FOR
CERTIFIED & COURT-APPOINTED MEDIATORS R. 10.100(c) (1992) (only applies to
circuit court mediators), Idaho, see IDAHO CT. R. 16 (k) (13) (A) (1998), Indiana,
see IND. ADR R. 2.5(A) (2) (1996), Louisiana, see LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 4106(A)(1) (1997), Michigan, MICH. CT. R. 2.404(B) (2) (a) (1993), Montana,
MONT. R. APP. PROC. 54(d) (4) (1998) (only applies to appellate cases), South
Carolina, S.C. CIR. CT. MEDIATION R. 10(a) (1999), and Washington D.C. Of
these eight, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Louisiana, Michigan and Montana
require attorneys to have five years experience prior to certification or
qualification.
22. This legalization of mediation through court annexation has come
under attack by those who argue that court-referred mediation is not an alter-
native dispute resolution mechanism, but an administrative aid for the courts,
an "add-on" process for the parties and a monopoly for lawyer-mediators.. See
Louis J. Weber, Court-Referred ADR and the Lawyer-Mediator: In Service of Whom?,
46 SMU L. REv. 2113, 2114 (1993) (describing court-referred ADR as an "addi-
tional" dispute resolution mechanism, an "add-on" procedure and calling for
the return to ADR as a public service, and away from its current direction as a
vehicle of profit for greedy lawyers scrambling in a depressed market); see also
Alfini, Trashing, Bashing, and Hashing It Out, supra note 15, at 47 (citing Albie
Davis, director of the mediation project in the District Court Department of the
Trial Court of Massachusetts, whose reaction to the Florida rule requiring
mediators in non-family civil cases to either be experienced lawyers or retired
judges-was to say that the requirement portends "the end of good media-
tion"); Leonard L. Riskin, Toward New Standards for the Neutral Lawyer in Media-
tion, 26 ARIz. L. REv. 329, 336 (1984) (writing over fifteen years ago, that
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complex legal questions,23 the greater subject-matter expertise
lawyers often bring to mediations,2 4 and the expertise parties
expect them to have, 25 especially compared to non-lawyer
mediators. 26 Recent studies further reveal that lawyers referring
cases to mediators prefer those who fit the more "evaluative"
profile.
2 7
"[m]ost lawyers are ill-suited, by training and inclination, to the mediator's
role").
23. See Menkel-Meadow, Is Mediation the Practice of Law?, supra note 11, at
61. Menkel-Meadow writes, "Complex mediation these days often involves legal
questions and mediator prediction or evaluation of the legal merits or 'likely
outcomes' of cases. Wouldn't you want a mediator with legal expertise if you
were involved in an important case?" Id. She goes on to say, however, "Just
because a mediator has a law degree-or even an up-to-date license to prac-
tice-does not mean that he or she will give accurate legal advice, prediction,
or evaluation." Id.
24. SeeJohn Forester, Lawrence Susskind: Activist Mediation and Public Dis-
putes, in WHEN TALK WORKS: PROFILES OF MEDIATORS 331 (Deborah M. Kolb et
al. eds., 1994).
25. Donald Weckstein attributes the move toward more evaluative meth-
ods to the parties and their lawyers. See Weckstein, supra note 19, at 526 ("One
suspects.., that the preference and expectations of the parties and their law-
yers significantly contribute to the widespread use of the evaluative mediation
model-a rationale that is consistent with disputant empowerment.").
26. See SamuelJ. Imperati, Mediator Practice Models: The Intersection of Ethics
and Stylistic Practices in Mediation, 33 WILLAMETrE L. REv. 703, 729 (1997) (A
mediator cannot engage in an evaluative-type mediation if the mediator does
not have subject matter expertise.... In the legal setting, parties often look to
mediators to have both process familiarity and subject matter expertise.
Whether the mediator is facilitative or evaluative, some subject matter under-
standing usually is required simply to help the parties communicate effectively
and reach resolution.").
27. In a 1997 survey, 160 of the 600 members of the Hillsborough County
Trial Lawyers Section responded. See Martha J. Cook, Survey, (1997) (on file
with author). The results showed that 90% preferred evaluative mediation. See
id.; see also Barbara McAdoo, A Report to the Minnesota Supreme Court: The Impact
of Rule 114 on Civil Litigation Practice in Minnesota (Dec. 1997) (on file with the
Minnesota Supreme Court of Continuing Education and author):
Data confirms that the most important qualification for a mediator is
substantive experience in the field of law related to the case. Approxi-
mately two thirds of the Minnesota lawyers surveyed reported that hav-
ing the mediator be a litigator and lawyer also are important
qualifications. Over two thirds of the lawyers surveyed reported that
mediators encourage clients to participate, use caucuses effectively,
press for settlement, propose realistic settlement ranges, and help par-
ties to communicate effectively.
McAdoo &Welsh found: (1) lawyers want lawyers to mediate; (2) lawyers want
litigators as mediators; and (3) most importantly, lawyers want mediators to
have substantive experience in the field of law related to the case. See McAdoo
&Welsh, supra note 1, at 390.
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Some scholars view this change in mediation matter-of-
factly, as a perhaps inevitable development in a practice that is
undergoing such significant growth. Leonard Riskin, for exam-
ple, defines mediation wholly empirically. Mediation is, on his
account, whatever mediators do.2" Since mediators differ in
their styles and approaches, ranging from those who are strictly
facilitative in the classical sense to those who are highly, even
aggressively, evaluative, Riskin claims that mediation must be
understood as a continuum, a practice that spans the full
spectrum.2 9
This is not to say that Riskin does not recognize or appreci-
ate the important difference between facilitative and evaluative
mediation. He acknowledges that the "largest cloud of confusion
and contention surrounds the issue of whether a mediator may
evaluate."3 Yet when he created his popular mediator grid, he
sought to reduce the ambiguity surrounding what counts as
mediation by suggesting that the practice should be defined
according to whatever transpires within its purported occur-
rence." 1 Citing Ludwig Wittgenstein for the proposition that
"usage determines meaning,"3 2 Riskin thus mapped out four
mediation style quadrants-evaluative, facilitative, narrow, and
broad,"3 claiming that all possible approaches to mediation
resulting therefrom (evaluative-narrow, facilitative-narrow, evalu-
ative-broad, and facilitative-broad) count as legitimate mediation
styles.3 4
28. See Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations, Strategies,
and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARv. NEGOTATION L. REv. 7, 21-37
(1996) (describing the problem-definition continuum, mediator orientations,
and mediator techniques, all of which he maintains fall under the definition of
mediation).
29. See id. at 22-38.
30. Id. at 9. John Feerick, Dean of Fordham University School of Law and
chair of the Joint Committee, maintains that "the lens [Riskin] has chosen will
perpetuate confusion about what mediation is. Therefore, I would prefer draw-
ing a bright line around mediation as a process in which the neutral facilitates
the bargaining of the parties, rather than evaluating the merits of an issue or
situation." Symposium, supra note 9, at 104 (comments ofJohn Feerick).
31. See Riskin, supra note 28, at 13 ("I hope to facilitate discussions and to
help clarify arguments by providing a system for categorizing and understand-
ing approaches to mediation."). Riskin acknowledges that his own orientation
is as a broad facilitative mediator, an approach which is not universal. He con-
tends that the time for narrow definitions is gone.
32. Id. at 13 n.19.
33. See id. at 24 (defining mediation as "a process in which an impartial
third party, who lacks authority to impose a solution, helps others resolve a
dispute or plan a transaction").
34. See id. at 26-34.
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To a great extent, Riskin's all-inclusive definition of media-
tion rests on the assumption that mediators conduct mediations
(and, a fortiori, the nature of mediation evolves) according to
how they perceive the wishes of the parties. He points out that a
mediator's need for subject-matter expertise typically increases in
direct proportion to the parties' need for mediator evaluation. 35
If it appears to the mediator that the parties want an active, evalu-
ative mediation, Riskin maintains that "the mediator ought to
evaluate and it is ethical."36
Riskin further premises his approach on the preferences
and orientations of the mediators themselves. All mediators, he
claims, come with a predominant orientation toward using cer-
tain strategies more frequently than others. 7 While many
mediators will move along the facilitative/evaluative continuum
throughout the course of a mediation as they see fit,3" most law-
yers will emphasize their dominant orientation.39 Evaluative
mediators simply are those who "assume [ ] that the participants
want and need . . . guidance as to the appropriate grounds for
the settlement."40
Others who agree with Riskin that mediation should be
defined inclusively likewise turn for justification to the interests
and desires of the parties. 4' Donald Weckstein surmises that the
35. See id. at 46. Riskin concludes his discussion on subject matter exper-
tise with a cautionary statement: "[T]oo much subject-matter expertise could
incline some mediators toward a more evaluative role, thereby interfering with
the development of creative solutions." Id. at 47.
36. Symposium, supra note 9, at 105 (comments of Leonard Riskin). Ris-
kin remarked, "[I]f the parties intelligently decide that they want the narrow
evaluative mediation .... the mediator ought to evaluate and it is ethical .... "
Id. He further stated, "[E]valuation can enhance self-determination." Id. at
101.
37. See Riskin, supra note 28, at 24-25 ("Most mediators operate from a
predominate, presumptive or default orientation," but "many mediators move
along continuums and among quadrants."). He notes that one's orientation is
usually grounded in the mediator's personality, education, training, and experi-
ence. See id. at 35.
38. See id. at 35-38.
39. See id. at 24-25.
40. Id. at 24.
41. See, e.g., Marjorie Corman Aaron, ADR Toolbox: The Highwire Act of
Evaluation, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 62, 62 (1996) (noting that
while the primary risk of evaluation is the mediator's potential loss of perceived
neutrality because the "loser" in the evaluation may view the mediator as an
adversary, nonetheless, situations do exist in which the careful and thoughtful
use of mediator evaluation can serve the parties); John Bickerman, Evaluative
Mediator Responds, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 70 (1996) (arguing
that the parties should have the right to chose between evaluative and facilita-
tive styles); James H. Stark, The Ethics of Mediation Evaluation: Some Troublesome
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move toward evaluative methods in mediation is directly attribu-
table to the wishes and expectations of the parties as well as their
lawyers.42 This, he says, is good, for it is "consistent with dispu-
tant empowerment.""3  Lawrence Susskind argues even more
forcefully that it is not merely a matter of preference, but a medi-
ator's duty to evaluate and take active responsibility for reaching
a sound agreement." By his account, the mediator is obligated
to enlighten the parties with ideas and potential solutions drawn
from the mediator's knowledge, experience, and expertise."5 To
Susskind, good mediators are "activists" who do not simply facili-
tate but work as "advocate [s] of a good solution.""6
Kimberlee Kovach and Lela Love, among others, have
directly challenged the inclusive approach, arguing that evalua-
tive mediators are not really mediating cases."7 To both Kovach
Questions and Tenative Proposals, from an Evaluative Lawyer Mediator, 38 S. TEX. L.
REv. 769 (1997) (supporting evaluative mediation); Weckstein, supra note 19
(arguing that professional information can empower disputants).
42. See Weckstein, supra note 19, at 526; cf JOHN W. COOLEY, MEDIATION
ADvocAcy 86-88, app. A-2 (1996) (describing the facilitative and evaluative
mediation styles, and recommending that attorneys and their clients select a
mediator based on the nature of the dispute and the style of mediation they
believe would best resolve it). See alsoJames H. Stark, supra note 10, at 487:
When settling their disputes, disputants must be permitted to invoke
legal norms if they choose to, and the mediator must take steps to
ensure that the parties' choices are knowing and informed. In my
view, any threat to the appearance of neutrality and impartiality is a
necessary price that mediators must pay for party empowerment and
informed consent.
43. Weckstein, supra note 19, at 526.
44. See Forester, supra note 24, at 323-33.
45. See id. at 328-31. Susskind is critical of those who disdain substantive
expertise and the use thereof:
[Y]ou're less than a helpful advocate of a good outcome if you can't
bring to [the parties] the experience of others that they don't know,
with the range of solutions they might invent.... So the notion that
the mediator or facilitator shouldn't have any expertise doesn't make
any sense. It's only if you say, "My job is to help the parties reach an
agreement amongst themselves. I don't care about the agreement; I
have no responsibility for the agreement. I'm neutral! I'm neutral
with regard to the quality to the outcome. I don't care about the out-
come; I'm a process person .... I don't need any expertise except
process expertise." That's nuts.
Id. at 331; see alsoJames Alfini & Gerald S. Clay, Should Lawyer-Mediators Be Pro-
hibitedfrom Providing Legal Advice or Evaluations?, Disp. RESOL. MAG., Spr. 1994, at
8 (Clay, an attorney-mediator, argues that "[e]ffective mediation almost always
requires some analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of each party's position
should the dispute be arbitrated or litigated").
46. Forester, supra note 24, at 331.
47. See Kovach & Love, Evaluative Mediation, supra note 15, at 31 (arguing
that evaluation tends to perpetuate or create an adversarial climate and discour-
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and Love, mediation must be understood not as a grand ADR
practice, encompassing the wide spectrum of divergent tech-
niques outlined by Riskin in his grid, but as one among several
forms of ADR.48 Mediation, that is, should be understood in
terms of its place on the ADR spectrum, not as forming a spec-
trum unto itself.
Kovach and Love each characterize the role of the mediator
as strictly limited to facilitation. 49 Echoing the classical defini-
tion, Kovach and Love maintain that the province of mediation is
to assist parties in evaluating their own situations and developing
their own solutions.5 ° Mediators may facilitate communication
between the parties, help focus their understanding of their own
and others' interests, assist in creative problem solving, and
otherwise help the parties devise their own agreement. 51 Yet,
they argue, if the assistance a mediator offers becomes directive,
such as providing legal advice or offering an evaluative assess-
ment of each party's position, then the mediator is no longer
mediating.52
Neither Kovach nor Love seeks to prohibit what Riskin and
others call "evaluative" mediation. They do not object to evalua-
tion outright; indeed, they acknowledge that at times an activist,
age understanding and problem-solving); Kovach & Love, Mapping Mediation,
supra note 15, at 106-10 (arguing for a bright line between the various ADR
processes and asking evaluative mediators to name and label the process they
use as neutral evaluation or non-binding arbitration to avoid confusion and to
clarify expectations); Love, supra note 15, at 939 (stating that "differences
between evaluators and facilitators mean that each use different skills and tech-
niques, and each requires different competencies, training norms, and ethical
guidelines to perform their respective functions"); see alsoJoseph B. Stulberg,
Facilitative Versus Evaluative Mediator Orientations: Piercing the "Grid" Lock, 24 FLA.
ST. U. L. REv. 985, 989 (1997) (maintaining that mediation and the evaluative
processes used in adjudicatory processes are not the "same enterprises").
48. See Kovach & Love, Evaluative Mediation, supra note 15, at 31-32;
Kovach & Love, Mapping Mediation, supra note 15, at 77 ("By mixing the func-
tions traditionally associated with arbitrators, case evaluators, and judges with
those of mediators, the Grid suggests that mediation significantly overlaps with
those other processes. This blurring of distinctive processes is an unnecessary
and unhealthy capitulation.").
49. See, e.g., Kovach & Love, Evaluative Mediation, supra note 15, at 31;
Kovach & Love, Mapping Mediation, supra note 15, at 106; cf Love, supra note 15,
at 939.
50. See Kovach & Love, Mapping Mediation, supra note 15, at 88-89, 92;
Love, supra note 15, at 938.
51. See Kovach & Love, Mapping Mediation, supra note 15, at 79-81 (stating
that some evaluative techniques are used by facilitative mediators); Love, supra
note 15, at 939.
52. See Kovach & Love, Mapping Mediation, supra note 15, at 80-81.
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evaluative dispute resolution approach is appropriate.5" They
simply say that to be responsible toward the profession and
entirely candid with the parties, third-party neutrals must name
and label the ADR processes they use.54 Activist, evaluative ADR,
where the third-party neutral advises the parties how to proceed
or takes control of the outcome is, on their account, not media-
tion but something more akin to neutral evaluation.55 Moreover,
if a mediator engages in a "mixed" ADR process-part mediation
in the classical facilitative sense and part neutral evaluation-
then he or she should name each process.56 According to Love,
mediators who are asked to evaluate can do so, "as long as the
process of evaluating [is] recognized as a whole set of different
activities than mediation."57
B. The Mistaken Notion that All Evaluation Forms a
Part of Mediation
The evaluative/facilitative debate has thus resulted in oppos-
ing camps each striving to influence the way mediation is con-
ceived as a form of ADR. Riskin and others advocate an inclusive
definition where mediation is regarded as'whatever mediators
do. For some like Riskin, directive, overfly evaluative dispute res-
olution techniques are not necessarily desirable, but they must
be treated as part of mediation practice since they occur within
53. See id. at 79; Love, supra note 15, at 948.
54. See Kovach & Love, Mapping Mediation, supra note 15, at 79, 109; Love,
supra note 15, at 948 ("Mediators who regularly give case assessments and
expert opinions should continue those practices only if they are requested by
the parties, properly advertised, and accurately labeled."). See also Alfini, Evalu-
ative Versus Facilitative Mediation, supra note 15, at 929 (comments of Lela Love).
Love contends that "the neutral mediator must be competent to give the opin-
ion and should be liable for careless opinions which could cost the parties a
great deal. The process should be labeled mediation and neutral evaluation."
Id.
55. See Kovach & Love, Mapping Mediation, supra note 15, at 79, 89, 92.
56. See Alfini, Evaluative Versus Facilitative Mediation, supra note 15, at 929
(comments of Lela Love clarifying her position that mediators should never
provide legal advice or outcome predictions); Kovach & Love, Mapping Media-
tion, supra note 15, at 92 ("Entities inevitably evolve and change, but they
should assume a new name when their mutation alters their fundamental char-
acteristics. For example, we do not call butterflies caterpillars."); Love, supra
note 15, at 948 (maintaining that mixed processes can be useful, but mediators
should properly label the separate processes).
57. Alfini, Evaluative Versus Facilitative Mediation, supra note 15, at 933
(comments of Lela Love).
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the context of mediations.58 Others, like Weckstein and Suss-
kind find the activist, directive techniques to be not merely part
of mediation as a matter of fact, but in many situations com-
pelled by the ethical obligations mediators owe the parties.59 To
those in the other camp, such as Kovach and Love, such talk dis-
solves the distinction between mediation and the evaluative ADR
processes. And turns it into an amorphous, catch-all.6 ° Kovach
and Love prefer a brighter line definition of mediation that sets
it apart according to its historically singular function as a facilita-
tive method only.6"
While I sympathize with Kovach and Love in their desire to
hold fast to the classical definition of mediation, the bright-line
approach they recommend is unworkable. Few words or con-
cepts lend themselves to such definitional precision. Most terms,
and certainly those representing practice-bound concepts such as
mediation, permit only hazy definitional boundaries.62 Kovach
and Love may well be correct in suggesting that mediation is bet-
ter understood by identifying its place on the ADR spectrum
than by viewing it as an isolated continuum or 'grid' of its own.
The ADR spectrum, however, must not be conceived as a number
line where each form of ADR occupies a clearly marked
independent position. Rather, it forms a spectrum along the
lines of a color spectrum, such that every ADR method can be
understood only in relation to the others into which it blends
and fades.
Mediation, in other words, is a form of ADR separate and
distinct from other ADR methods, though at the outer bounda-
58. See Riskin, supra note 28, at 13 (acknowledging that he favors the
facilitative-broad approach but that it is too late to tell practitioners that what
they do is not mediation).
59. See Weckstein, supra note 19; see also Forester, supra note 24, at 326-33.
60. See Kovach & Love, Mapping Mediation, supra note 15, at 106-10.
61. See id. at 108-10.
62. The use of the words "proposition," "language," etc. has the hazi-
ness of the normal use of concept-words in our language. To think
this makes them unusable, or ill-adapted to their purpose, would be
like wanting to say "the warmth this stove gives is no use, because you
can't feel where it begins and where it ends."
If I wish to draw sharp boundaries to clear up or avoid misunder-
standings in the area of a particular use of language, these will be
related to the fluctuating boundaries of the natural use of language in
the same way as sharp contours in a pen-and-ink sketch are related to
the gradual transitions between patches of colour in the reality
depicted.
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR 120 (Rush Rhees ed. &
Anthony Kenny trans., 1974); see also id. at 77 ("If we look at the actual use of a
word, what we see is something constantly fluctuating.").
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ries of its practice it becomes difficult to differentiate from other
methods such as neutral evaluation. At its core, "mediation" has
been defined as "a voluntary process in which a neutral third
party, who lacks authority to impose a solution, helps the partici-
pants reach their own agreement for resolving a dispute or plan-
ning a transaction. ' 63 By contrast, "neutral evaluation" amounts
to "a process in which the parties present their dispute before a
neutral expert and receive an unprejudiced assessment of their
case."6 4 Yet where mediation ends and neutral evaluation begins,
there is no bright line. Advocates of an all-inclusive definition of
mediation stress this point, noting that in the midst of the evalua-
tive/facilitative debate there remains a lack of agreement about
what truly constitutes evaluation. Mediators "evaluate" in various
ways. Weckstein prefers a very directive "issue-by-issue evalua-
tion, particularly if combined with a decision analysis which seeks
to establish probabilities of success at each step of a potential
judicial proceeding."65 This sounds very much like neutral evalu-
ation. Others, however, use far less intrusive techniques.
Marjorie Corman Aaron recommends evaluative assessments of a
range of fair outcomes, where the mediator suggests "a range
within which an intelligent, neutral, fair-minded person would
find it reasonable for the parties to settle."66 Others prefer using
the Socratic method to do reality testing.67 For these mediators,
" [q] uestions become suggestions in the guise of a query."68 Suss-
kind, favoring the Socratic approach, regards such questioning as
63. Leonard L. Riskin, The Special Place of Mediation in Alternative Dispute
Processing, 37 U. FLA. L. REv. 19, 24 (1985); see also NANCY H. ROGERS & RICHARD
A. SALEM, A STUDENT'S GUIDE TO MEDIATION AND THE LAw 1 (1987) ("Mediation
is a process through which two or more disputing parties negotiate a voluntary
settlement of their differences with the help of a third party (the mediator) who
typically has no stake in the outcome."); Weckstein, supra note 19, at 508
("While differing somewhat in language and detail, most modern definitions of
mediation contain two common elements: (1) third-party facilitation of dispute
settlement, and (2) lack of third-party power to determine the resolution of the
dispute.").
64. U.S.D.C. D.C. app. B (1996) (Dispute Resolution Programs, at 847).
65. Weckstein, supra note 19, at 553.
66. Aaron, supra note 41, at 64. While Aaron favors evaluation, she
regards it as a last resort and as a means of helping the parties assess their
progress and potential solutions, not as the final word. See also IND. CODE § 4-
21.5-3.5-19 (1996) (applying to mediations involving administrative agencies,
allows a mediator, in joint or separate sessions, to "express an evalaution of the
proceeding ... [which] may be expressed in the form of settlement ranges
rather than exact amounts").
67. See Weckstein, supra note 19, at 521.
68. Deborah M. Kolb & Kenneth Kressel, The Reality of Making Talk Work,
in WHEN TALK WORKS, supra note 24, at 472.
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a "way of teaching without lecturing"6 9 and at the same time,
acknowledges that questions are a form of activism.7° To this,
Professor Love replies, "Asking questions comports with the
mediator's role, but giving or suggesting answers does not."7 Yet
if the method of questioning is Socratic, or the nature of the
questions leading or rhetorical, then the mere fact that a third-
party neutral may choose to proceed by asking questions instead
of stating propositions hardly provides a bright-line by which to
characterize the process as mediation or neutral evaluation.
It is likely not possible, that is, to define mediation with such
a sharp boundary as to preserve the process as purely facilitative
without some tincture of evaluation. This lack of a sharp bound-
ary, however, does not mean that mediation is boundless. Riskin
and others who allude to Wittgenstein's famous proposition that
"meaning is use,"72 and who from that advocate an all-inclusive
definition of mediation, misuse Wittgenstein and fail to recognize
that the nature of a practice or activity is to be understood
according to the actions of those who perform it well, not by the
mistakes of those who do not.73 Wittgenstein well-recognized
that people often use words mistakenly.74 And he understood
that while a practice, activity, or technique develops its sense
through the actions of its participants, a great gulf may well sepa-
rate the nature of any such practice or technique from the errors
of those who may blunder through it.75 That a dancer falls dur-
ing a ballet does not make falling part of good dance. That
umpires may call strikes and balls inconsistently does not make
inconsistency or a shifting strike zone part of good baseball.
That most drivers on urban freeways often exceed the speed limit
does not make the typical speed the lawful limit. That certain
investors may engage in insider trading, some judges accept
bribes or act with bias, certain politicians sell the public interest
for the sake of reelection, does not mean their actions should be
taken into account in redefining the ethical contours of their
69. Id. at 473; see also Weckstein, supra note 19, at 550 ("The question
format of the suggestion also makes it easier for the parties to reject it, but that
does not make it any less a suggestion.").
70. See Forester, supra note 24, at 328 (quoting Susskind: "I'm not pre-
tending that by asking it as a question, you're not being acitivist. Quite the
contrary. I'm saying that's the form of activism that I would personally pre-
scribe . . ").
71. Symposium, supra note 9, at 108 (comments of Lela Love).
72. Riskin, supra note 28, at 13.
73. See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, I §§ 9, 54
(1973).
74. See, e.g., id. at I §§ 54, 143.
75. See, e.g., id. at I §§ 197-203.
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respective practices. And the fact that some parties and lawyers
prefer active, evaluative mediators does not necessarily pull the
conduct of those mediators within the realm of good mediation
practice.
Riskin's empirical claim that activist, evaluative dispute reso-
lution techniques are part of mediation and, thereby, ethical thus
quite simply begs the question. The recent proliferation of eval-
uative techniques in mediation can equally well be seen as evi-
dence of a practice in distress, overrun by legally-trained
professionals unable to convert their directive, decision making
orientations to fit the facilitative mode.76 Under this interpreta-
tion, the nature of the practice takes priority over the prefer-
ences of the practitioners.
As Kovach and Love argue, ADR practitioners owe the par-
ties and their profession candor and clarity in labeling the dispute
resolution method(s) they use. There are definitely times when
a mediator will find him or herself participating in a mixed pro-
cess that lies indistinguishably along the hazy boundary between
mediation and another ADR method. But if the mediator subse-
quently recognizes that the process has edged into say, neutral
evaluation, then ethics demands that the mediator not simply con-
tinue the process under the guise that the parties want 'evalua-
tive' mediation. He or she should inform them that the process
they initially agreed to has changed, advise them of the nature
and name of the new process, and ensure their understanding
and consent to continue. As Love has stressed, the parties must
fully be apprized of the process involved and advised that a pre-
dominately evaluative process differs markedly from one that is
in the main facilitative.
Without such candor, evaluation threatens to undermine
the two central principles underlying mediation-the self-deter-
mination of the parties and the impartiality of the mediator. To
many, it is these principles that set mediation apart from other
forms of dispute resolution. 77 John Feerick calls self-determina-
76. While most trainers teach facilitative methods, see Kovach & Love,
Evaluative Mediation, supra note 15, at 31, this training does not change the law-
yers' years of training and experience in the adversarial process. Thus most
lawyers revert to their dominant orientation. See Riskin, supra note 37.
77. See, e.g., Nolan-Haley, supra note 8, at 790-91 (pointing out that it is
the parties' retention of decision-making responsibility that distinguishes medi-
ation from litigation); Alison Taylor, Concepts of Neutrality in Family Mediation:
Concepts, Ethics, Influence, and Transformative Process, 14 MEDIATION Q. 215
(1997).
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tion "the most fundamental principle of mediation."78 Others
stress that the very integrity of mediation demands that
mediators ever "remain impartial and evenhanded."79
The importance of these two principles is not lost on most
advocates of activist mediation. Riskin, for example, emphasizes
that parties to a mediation should understand that once they
allow the mediator to express an opinion on the merits of their
dispute, that opinion "will almost always have a powerful impact
on all further negotiations."80 But if the parties consent as a
practical matter to giving the mediator control over their "self-
determination," Riskin considers the giving of the opinion
unproblematic. To Robert Moberly, the requirement of self-
determination itself calls for evaluation when the parties express
that as their preference.8
Weckstein concurs, arguing that "unless a qualified media-
tor is permitted to ethically offer pertinent information that a
party has not or cannot obtain from other sources, that party's
ability to engage in self-determination will be impaired."82
It is dubious to think, however, that party se fdetermination
can only be realized through dependence on the greater wisdom
and even-handed distribution of information by the mediator.
This is akin to suggesting that the true self-realization of woman-
hood requires submitting oneself to the paternalistic dominance
of a protective husband. As John Stuart Mill wrote over a century
ago: "The principle of freedom cannot require that [one]
should be free not to be free. It is not freedom to be allowed to
alienate [one's] freedom."83 Similarly, it is not self-determina-
tion to alienate one's right to direct one's own destiny. The
claim that such alienation in mediation is necessary, a claim
implicit in the writings of Weckstein and Susskind, among others,
is what leads the opponents of evaluation to characterize the very
idea of 'evaluative mediation' as oxymoronic.84
The question thus remains whether it is possible to engage
in evaluation without fundamentally compromising the princi-
ples of self-determination and impartiality. Kovach argues that
impartiality is necessarily compromised, for evaluation "invaria-
78. John D. Feerick, Toward Uniform Standards of Conduct for Mediators, 38
S. TEX. L. REv. 455, 460 (1997).
79. JOINT STANDARDS OF CoNDucr FOR MEDIATORS, Standard II (1994).
80. Riskin, supra note 28, at 24.
81. See Robert B. Moberly, Mediator Gag Rules: Is It Ethical for Mediators to
Evaluate or Advise?, 38 S. TEX. L. REv. 669, 672 (1997).
82. Weckstein, supra note 19, at 539.
83. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Mary Warnock ed., 1962) (1859).
84. See Kovach & Love, Evaluative Mediation, supra note 15.
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bly favors one side over the other." 5 It has also been suggested
that even if an evaluation is as a matter of fact even-handed,
there is always the risk that it will be perceived as partial by one
or more parties.8 6 Should such an appearance take hold, the
reality of the mediator's impartiality becomes irrelevant, for the
perceived loss of neutrality undercuts the integrity of the process
as the party disgruntled by the evaluation comes to view the
mediator as an adversary.8 7 Yet to Weckstein at least, this threat
that evaluation poses to mediator impartiality is of little concern.
For impartiality, he claims, is an "ideal, but it is neither realistic
in all cases nor an essential ingredient of the process. '88
Perhaps of greater concern than how activist, evaluative
techniques impact particular mediators is the danger they pres-
ent to the very continuation of mediation as an ADR process dis-
tinct from law."9 As James Alfini has noted, evaluation threatens
to transform mediation from a consensual to a coercive pro-
cess.9 ° This threat has grown substantially in recent years as law-
yers have increasingly joined the ranks of mediation
practitioners. Trained in the adversarial, legal mode as partisan
representatives, many lawyer-mediators quite understandably
find evaluative, directive techniques more comfortable and natu-
ral than the facilitative, consensual approach of classical media-
tion practice." Now, some may wish to argue that mediation
ought, as a practical matter, be reconceived and transformed into
an evaluative process more attuned to the legal mind, where
sound outcomes are achieved under the watchful direction and
control of the mediator. The very notion of mediation as a
facilitative process where the parties truly create their own agree-
ment may be an unreasonable and unachievable ideal. But if it
is, and if it is true that mediation as a practice ought to be trans-
formed, then we must acknowledge the failure of the classical
model and admit and justify the new mediation paradigm. The
85. Id. at 31.
86. See Aaron, supra note 41, at 62.
87. See id.
88. Weckstein, supra note 19, at 510.
89. See Alison E. Gerencser, Alternative Dispute Resolution Has Morphed into
Medation: Standards of Conduct Must Be Changed, 50 FLA. L. REV. 843, 864 (1998).
90. SeeJamesJ. Alfini, Trashing, Bashing and Hashing It Out, supra note 15,
at 50.
91. See Kovach & Love, Evaluative Mediation, supra note 15, at 32 (" 'Evalu-
ative mediation' shifts mediation back into the comfortable framework of the
adversarial norm."); Kovach & Love, Mapping Mediation, supra note 15, at 96
("Lawyers like most people feel comfortable with what they know best . ...
Accordingly, they attempt to draw mediation back into their adversarial
paradigm.").
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justification required would have to include assurances that the
basic principles of self-determination and impartiality will not be
compromised or, if they are, that they were unnecessary in the
first place. And it would demand that all concerned accept the
expanded role of the mediator on which the evaluative media-
tion paradigm rests.
More than anything, the evaluative paradigm calls for
mediators to assume far greater power and control over the
mediation process than they ever exercised under the classical
model. Whether the arguments for this expanded role are
sound or not, one thing about them is patently true-that they
rest on a paternalistic attitude toward the process and parties
involved in mediation.92 Riskin describes the facilitative media-
tor as one who "assumes that the parties are intelligent, able to
work with their counterparts, and capable of understanding their
situations better than the mediator and, perhaps better than the
lawyers."" To the contrary, the evaluative mediator takes a
paternalistic attitude toward the parties and an attitude of domi-
nance and control toward the process.
This attitude of paternalism comes through most strongly in
the activist evaluation approach discussed by Susskind. Com-
menting on the issue of impartiality, Susskind explains that the
"activist" mediator is not neutral, but "nonpartisan" with regard to
outcome.94 This is to say that the activist mediator sees him or
herself as an "advocate" of the "best possible outcome," though
he or she maintains a posture of disinterest toward the parties
individually.95 In taking such a personal interest in the outcome,
the activist mediator further presumes that the "best possible out-
come" can only be achieved under his or her guidance and con-
trol, not through the creative energies of the parties. It becomes
the duty of the activist mediator, then, to "train" the parties how
to put their options on the table and advocate their own inter-
ests.96 Yet mediators who see their role as one of training the
parties, no matter how impartial they may be, are paternalistic.
And mediators who approach the process as "advocate[s] of a
good solution" 7 are necessarily adopting an attitude of' power
and control over the outcome, an attitude which cannot but
compromise the principles of self-determination and
impartiality.
92. See Nolan-Haley, supra note 8, at 815.
93. Riskin, supra note 28, at 24.
94. Forester, supa note 24, at 328-29.
95. Id. at 332.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 331.
PRESERVING THE INTEGRITY OF MEDIATION
Activist, evaluative approaches to mediation thus do pose a
significant threat to the continued existence of mediation as a
separate and distinct form of ADR. Yet despite the threat, the
debate over evaluative and facilitative mediation styles, as is cur-
rently occurring within the academic community, is just begin-
ning and will likely be with us for some time. Unfortunately,
mediation practice cannot wait for this theoretical debate to run
its course. It is necessary as a practical matter to create ethical
rules now that protect mediation from being dissolved into a
mere appendage to the legal system.9" Toward the feasibility of
that end we will now turn.
II. REGULATING LAWYER-MEDIATORS THROUGH LAWYER RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
All fifty states and the District of Columbia have adopted
rules of professional responsibility for lawyers that follow or are
modeled largely on the ABA's Model Code of Professional
Responsibility or its Model Rules of Professional Conduct. The
Model Code and the Model Rules both rest on the conceptual
model of lawyers engaged in conventional, adversarial legal rep-
resentation.99 While no one questions whether these standards
apply and govern lawyer conduct during traditional trial repre-
sentation, the scope of their application becomes murky when
lawyers mediate disputes. Do the rules of professional responsi-
bility or professional conduct govern? Is the lawyer engaged in
the practice of law?100 Does the mediator's style affect the
debate?
The Model Rules and the Model Code themselves provide
little guidance as to their application to lawyers engaged in medi-
ation.01 The Model Rules contain only one express mention of
mediation. Model Rule 2.2, titled "Intermediary," permits an
attorney to act as an intermediary between clients under certain
conditions. The rule's comment section expressly excludes attor-
98. See, e.g., Gerencser, supra note 89, at 849 ("Mediation has been co-
opted by legal advocates and become part of the adversary process."); Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation
Co-opted or The Law of ADR, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. Rav. 1 (1991) (arguing that ADR
already has been co-opted by the adversary system).
99. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble (1997) ("A
lawyer is a representative of clients . . ").
100. See Furlan, supra note 7, at 272-87 (discussing whether mediation is
the practice of law); Menkel-Meadow, Is Mediation the Practice of Law, supra note
11, at 61 (arguing that applying legal standards to concrete facts and making
predictions constitutes the practice of law, regardless of whether there is a law-
yer-client relationship).
101. See Furlan, supra note 7, at 278-302; Smiley, supra note 11.
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ney-mediators. The comment explains that the rule "does not
apply to a lawyer acting as arbitrator or mediator between or
among parties who are clients of the lawyer, even where the law-
yer has been appointed with the concurrence of the parties."''
2
The effect of this exclusion is unclear. Some have argued that
this comment suggests that the conflict of interest rules do not
apply to a lawyer while he or she is acting as a mediator,1°3
though this remains open to debate.10 4
The strongest argument for treating mediation by lawyers as
covered by the Model Rules comes from Model Rule 5.7, regard-
ing "law-related services" by lawyers. 10 5 Model Rule 5.7(a) stipu-
lates that any professional activity by a lawyer falls under the
Rules of Professional Conduct as a "law-related service" so long as
it is a service provided:
(1) by the lawyer in circumstances that are not distinct
from the lawyer's provision of legal services to clients; or
(2) by a separate entity controlled by the lawyer... if the
lawyer fails to take reasonable measures to assure that a
person obtaining the law-related services knows that the
services of the separate entity are not legal services and
that the protections of the client-lawyer relationship do not
exist.106
A question exists as to whether a lawyer's "law-related services" as
defined in Model Rule 5.7107 include mediations.' To date,
five states have adopted Model Rule 5.7, two of which stipulates
102. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 2.2 cmt. (1997).
103. See Sub, supra note 3, at 163 n.40.
104. See Maute, supra note 2, at 510-11 (discussing the split of opinion on
the applicability of Model Rule 2.2 to mediation).
105. See, e.g., Jonathan A. Beyer, Practicing Law at the Margins: Surveying
Ethics Rules for Legal Assistants and Lawyers who Mediate, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
411, 413-16 (1998) (discussing mediation as a law-related service and conclud-
ing that "mediation satisfies the general definition of a law-related service as
offered in the amended Model Rule 5.7"); Loretta W. Moore, Lawyer Mediators:
Meeting the Ethical Challenges, 30 FAM. L.Q. 679, 681-84 (1996) (providing an
analysis of Model Rule 5.7 and mediation services).
106. MODEL RuL.s OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.7(a) (1998).
107. Model Rule 5.7 defines "law-related services" as "services that might
reasonably be performed in conjunction with and in substance are related to
the provision of legal services, and that are not prohibited as unauthorized
practice of law when provided by a nonlawyer." Id. Rule 5.7(b).
108. See COMMISSION ON ETHICS MODEL RuLE, supra note 12, at 2. See also
Furlan, supra note 7, at 290-99 ("[T]he legal nature of mediated disputes, cou-
pled with the potential for confusion that may arise from the mediator's status
as an attorney, makes it reasonable to suppose that mediation does fall within
the scope of Model Rule 5.7 .... ."); Bruce Meyerson, Lawyers Who Mediate Are
Not Practicing Law, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 74, 75 (1996) (main-
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that ADR services are "law-related services," while the other three
take no position on the question.1 °9
The principal drawback to applying the ABA Model Rules
(or any existing state lawyer rules of professional responsibility)
to lawyer-mediators is that the traditional role of the lawyer as
advocate differs fundamentally from that of the lawyer-mediator.
Although the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, in contrast
to the earlier Model Code of Professional Responsibility, recog-
nize more diversity and specialization in the legal profession,1 10
neither deal with lawyers as third-party neutrals. The Model
Rules discuss lawyers in a wide variety of roles including serving
as advocates,1 1  intermediataries,1 2  prosecutors, 1 3  former
judges, arbitrators,'1 4 government officials, 1 5 and representa-
tives of entities.116 All of these roles envision the lawyer practic-
ing law in a representational capacity.
Ethical standards for mediators typically emphasize parties'
self-determination, mediator impartiality, the facilitative nature
of the process, and discourage mediators from engaging in activi-
ties that constitute the practice of law. 1 7 However, when lawyers
adopt an evaluative orientation by dispensing legal advice, apply-
taining that Rule 5.7 does appear to include mediation as an ancillary service
but arguing against its application to attorney-mediators).
109. Five states have adopted Model Rule 5.7. See INDIANA RULES OF PRO-
FESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.7 (1997); MAINE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIL-
iTy Rule 3.2(h) (1998); MASSACHUSETrS RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
5.7 (1998); NORTH DAKOTA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.7 (1997)
(comment section offers examples of law-related services which includes provid-
ing ADR services); PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.7
(1999). See also Andrew M. Goldner, Minding Someone Else's Business: Penn-
sylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 5.7 Leads the Way, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
767 (1998).
110. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Silences of the Restatement of the Law
Governing Lawyers: Lawyering As Only Adversary Practice, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
631, 635 (1997).
111. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (1998).
112. See id. Rule 2.2.
113. See id. Rule 3.8.
114. See id. Rule 1.12.
115. See id. Rule 1.11.
116. See id. Rule 1.13.
117. For example, Florida prohibits the mediator from giving his or her
personal opinion as to "how the court in which the case has been filed will
resolve the dispute." FLA. R. FOR CERTIFIED & COURT-APPoINTED MEDIATORS
10.370 (effective Apr. 1, 2000). Indiana allows a mediator, in joint or separate
sessions, to "express an evaluation of the proceeding . . . [which] may be
expressed in the form of settlement ranges rather than exact amounts." IND.
CODE § 4-21.5-3.5-19 (1996). In Montana, "[t]he role of the mediator is to
encourage and assists the parties to reach their own mutually-acceptable settle-
ment by facilitating communication; helping to clarify issues, interests, and the
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ing the law to the facts, or making specific predictions, they may
find that they fall under the rules of professional conduct. 18
The question then becomes whether mediation is the prac-
tice of law' 19 and, if so, whether lawyer-mediators can ethically
practice law within the mediation setting. While providing an all-
inclusive definition of the practice of law may well be impossi-
ble, 120 case law, commentators, and the Model Codes provide
some guidance as to its essential nature. Most fundamentally,
the practice of law is thought to rest on the existence of an attor-
ney-client relationship. 121 Many commentators argue that medi-
ation services should not be characterized as the practice of
law. 122 Here emphasis is placed on the lack of a "client."123 Yet
other factors contribute to the understanding of what constitutes
the practice of law. These include the performance of activities
appellate perspective; fostering joint problem-solving; and exploring settlement
alternatives." MoNr. R. OF APp. PROC. Rule 54 (e)(1) (1998).
118. See Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution, supra note
11, at 424 (1997) (arguing that when mediators evaluate the strengths and
weaknesses of a particular dispute by applying legal principles to specific facts,
mediators are engaging in the practice of law).
119. See Beyer, supra note 105, at 415-18; Furlan, supra note 7, at 272-87;
Purnell, supra note 19.
120. See State Bar v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 366 P.2d 1, 8-9 (Ariz.
1961) (noting that it is "impossible to lay down an exhaustive definition of 'the
practice of law'"); State Bar v. Cramer, 249 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Mich. 1976) (stating
that "any attempt to formulate a lasting, all encompassing definition of 'prac-
tice of law' is doomed to failure").
121. See New York County Lawyers' Ass'n v. Dacey, 283 N.Y.S.2d 984, 998
(App. Div.), rev'd, 234 N.E.2d 459 (N.Y. 1967) (stating that the "relation of con-
fidence and trust so necessary to the status of attorney and client is the essential
of legal practice").
Functionally, the practice of law relates to the rendition of services for
others that call for the professional judgment of a lawyer. The essence
of the professional judgment of the lawyer is his educated ability to
relate the general body and philosophy of law to a specific legal prob-
lem of a client.
MODEL CODE OF PROFEssIoNAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 3-5 (1981).
122. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 105, at 682.
123. See Meyerson, supra note 108, at 75 (1996) (arguing that to practice
law one must have a client: "Assuming that mediators clarify with parties that
no attorney-client relationship exists, engaging in a legal discussion would not
be the practice of law. Specifically, in order for a mediator's conduct in advis-
ing parties about the legal aspects of a particular dispute to be considered the
practice of law, the party to the mediation must view the mediator as her lawyer
and assume that she is receiving legal advice for her personal benefit."); but see
Menkel-Meadow, Is Mediation the Practice of Law?, supra note 11, at 61 (contend-
ing that applying legal principles to specific facts constitutes law practice
regardless of whether a lawyer-client relationship exists).
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that are "commonly understood to be the practice of law,"12" that
call for the application of law to specific factual situations, 125 or
that involve the exercise of judgment or the drafting of docu-
ments that impact the legal rights of others. 126
The lack of a consistent and uniform understanding of the
practice of law and its relationship to mediation hampers the
development of mediation. For example, the Rules of the D.C.
Court of Appeals Rule 49 addresses the "Unauthorized Practice
of Law." The Rule provides:
(b) (2) "Practice of Law" means the provision of profes-
sional legal advice or services where there is a client rela-
tionship of trust or reliance. One is presumed to be
practicing law when engaging in any of the following con-
duct on behalf of another:
(A) Preparing any legal document... intended to
affect or secure legal rights .... 127
The comment section to the rule makes it clear that this rule
does not apply to ADR services.1 28  Similarly, the Washington
State Board of Governors recently adopted the position that
124. See, e.g., Windover v. Sprague Tech., 834 F. Supp. 560, 566 (D. Conn.
1993); Monroe v. Horwitch, 820 F. Supp. 682, 686 (D. Conn. 1993); State Bar
Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 140 A.2d 863, 870 (Conn. 1958)).
125. See Oregon State Bar v. Gilchrist, 538 P.2d 913 (Or. 1975). Compare
New York County Lawyers' Ass'n v. Dacey, 234 N.E.2d 459 (N.Y. 1967) (holding
that How to Avoid Probate, which encouraged people to use "living wills" and
contained legal forms, was protected speech and did not involve the practice of
law), with Grievance Comm. v. Dacey, 222 A.2d 339 (Conn. 1966) (ruling that
Dacey, who in another book provided estate planning counseling to individual
potential mutual fund investors, was engaged in the unauthorized practice of
law), and Florida Bar v. Stupica, 300 So.2d 683, 686 (Fla. 1974) (holding that
information provided in a divorce kit was so "comprehensive and specific" and
so "parallel [ed]" the advice attorneys customarily provide clients seeking
divorce as to constitute the providing of legal advice and hence the unauthor-
ized practice of law).
126. See, e.g., In re Ellingson, 230 B.R. 426, 434 (D. Mont. 1999); Palmer v.
Unauthorized Practice Comm., 438 S.W.2d 374, 377 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
127. D.C. CT. App. R. 49(b)(2) (1995).
128. See id. R. 49 cmt.:
The Rule is not intended to cover the provision of mediation or alter-
native dispute resolution ("ADR") services. This intent is expressed in
the first sentences of the definition of the 'practice of law' which
requires the presence of two essential factors: The provision of legal
advice or services and a client relationship of trust and reliance, ADR
services are not given in circumstances where there is a client relation-
ship of trust and reliance; and it is common practice for providers of
ADR services explicitly to advise participants that they are not provid-
ing the services of legal counsel.
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mediation services are not the practice of law. 129 In contrast, the
New Jersey Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Professional
Ethics found that providing mediation services is the practice of
law. 13
0
The debate about whether mediation is the practice of law
becomes particularly thorny when the mediator uses an evalua-
tive approach that includes predicting likely outcomes should
the matter proceed to trial. This question does not arise in the
context of strictly facilitative mediation.1 31
Verbal disclaimers that mediation is not the practice of law
may not immunize the lawyer-mediator if her conduct during the
mediation is inconsistent with the verbal assertions. Responsible
mediators explain to the parties at the outset the nature of medi-
ation as a neutral process, making clear the distinction between
mediation services and legal services. They emphasize that medi-
ation is not the practice of law, and that no attorney-client rela-
tionship exists. They advise the parties that they may need to
consult independent legal counsel1 32 and should not look to the
mediator to protect their legal rights.'3 3 These verbal explana-
tions will not shield the mediator, however, from responsibility
129. See Washington State Bar Ass'n Comm. to Define the Practice of Law
(Final Report, July 30, 1999). The Report's definition of the Practice of Law
expressly excludes those "[s] erving in a neutral capacity as a mediator, arbitra-
tor, conciliator, or facilitator." See id. § (b) (4). The Board of Governors unani-
mously approved it on September 10, 1999 and forwarded it to the Washington
Supreme Court for adoption as a court rule. See Notes from conversation with
Robert Weldon, General Counsel for the Washington State Bar Association and
Reporter for Committee to Define the Practice of Law (on file with author).
130. See NewJersey Sup. Ct. Advisory Comm'n on Professional Ethics Op.
No. 676 (1994) (holding that when a lawyer serves as a third party neutral, "he
or she is acting as a lawyer and is not engaging in a separate business"). See also
Furlan, supra note 7, at 273 (discussing state statutes which have addressed the
question of what constitutes the practice of law).
131. See Imperati, supra note 26, at 718 ("Under the facilitative model, an
attorney who mediates is not practicing law during mediation, even if he or she
regularly engaged in a traditional attorney capacity outside the mediation
session.").
132. See Nolan-Haley, supra note 19, at 83, 99 (noting that while seeking
outside professionals may be desirable, it is "particularly illusory," "woefully
inadequate," and "practically unfeasible for the majority of Americans").
133. See Meyerson, supra note 108, at 74. Meyerson argues that to prac-
tice law one must have a client. Hence, he claims, mediators who offer the
parties no indication of legal representation face no problems in doling out
legal advice:
Assuming that mediators clarify with parties that no attorney-client
relationship exists, engaging in a legal discussion would not be the
practice of law. Specifically, in order for a mediator's conduct in advis-
ing parties about the legal aspects of a particular dispute to be consid-
ered the practice of law, the party to the mediation must view the
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for practicing law if her conduct truly exemplifies legal, rather
than mediation practice. Veiled attempts to call it a facilitative
process disappear once the lawyer-mediator engages in lawyering
activities such as dispensing legal advice and making predictions.
The lawyer is practicing law.
Thus, the more evaluative the techniques the mediator uses,
the more closely mediation comes to the practice of law. The
Model Rules as they stand do not expressly regulate this area of
lawyer conduct. State lawyer rules, currently silent on the role of
lawyer-mediators, provide an inadequate forum for resolving the
questions whether mediation constitutes the practice of law and,
if so, whether it is ethical for lawyers to practice law within the
context of the mediation process."' While courts occasionally
have tried to answer these questions using the traditional lawyer
rules, 35 their answers have been inconclusive, suggesting the
need for specific rules targeting the lawyer-mediator. These
rules could come in the form of an amendment to the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct,1 36 or perhaps through generic
rules of ethical conduct for mediators.
III. ETHICAL RULES FOR MEDIATORS-
THE UMBRELLA APPROACH
In 1992, the ABA, together with the American Arbitration
Association ("AAA") and the Society of Professionals in Dispute
Resolution ("SPIDR"), formed a joint committee to develop a
code of conduct for mediators. 137 After two years, this joint com-
mediator as her lawyer and assume that she is receiving legal advice
for her personal benefit.
Id.
134. See Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution, supra note
11, at 425 ("To conclude, as I do, that the flexibility of the mediator's role
includes the provision of legal information and legal advice and thus, 'the prac-
tice of law,' does not resolve by what standards of ethics or performance a third-
party neutral should be judged.").
135. See, e.g., Poly Software Int'l, Inc. v. Su, 880 F. Supp. 1487 (D. Utah
1995) (holding that while the rules of professional responsibility do not
expressly regulate attorney-mediators, they do address the issue of subsequent
representation); In reWaller, 573 A.2d 780 (D.C. App. 1990) (per curiam) (con-
cerning a lawyer-mediator who reported the misconduct of another attorney
under Rule 8.3, which he learned about during the course of a court-annexed
medical negligence and product liability mediation). In the In re Waller case,
the Board of Professional Responsibility supported the lawyer-mediator's deci-
sion, ruling that the confidentiality requirement was not intended to prevent
disclosure of such attorney misconduct. On appeal, the court upheld the
Board's decision.
136. See infra Pt. IV.
137. See Feerick, supra note 78, at 458.
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mittee issued its Joint Standards of Conduct for Mediators ('Joint
Standards"). The Joint Standards apply to all mediators, not
drawing a distinction between lawyer-mediators and other profes-
sional mediators.1"8 According to Dean John Feerick who served
as chair of the joint committee, the Joint Standards were meant
to provide a "starting point in the development of national ethi-
cal guidelines for the practice of mediation."1" 9 Conceived as a
set of "general considerations" for mediators, they are by design
"aspirational in nature and ... intended to be guideposts toward
the development of uniform standards of conduct for
mediators."14 °
While the members of the joint committee wrestled with the
issue of evaluative versus facilitative mediation, they did not
resolve it."' Regarding mediation as resting fundamentally on
the self-determination of the parties, the committee stressed that
mediators should be effective facilitators foremost,' 4 2 not 'evalu-
138. See id. at 459.
139. Id. at 477.
140. Id.
141. See id. at 472. See also Symposium, supra note 9, at 103 (Dean Feer-
ick, chair of the committee, notes that the standards encourage a facilitative
role but they do not prohibit an evaluative role: "Our committee did not view
mediation as an evaluative kind of process, however, but rather as a process
premised on the self-determination of the parties."); id. at 104-05 (comments of
Kovach, the reporter-drafter of the joint standards, noting that the most contro-
versial issue in drafting the Model Rules was the legitimacy of evaluative
mediation).
142. In the Preface, the Joint Committee defined mediation:
Mediation is a process in which an impartial third party-a media-
tor-facilitates the resolution of a dispute by promoting voluntary
agreement (or "self-determination") by the parties to the dispute. A
mediator facilitates communications, promoting understanding,
focusing the parties on their interests, and seeks creative problem-solv-
ing to enable the parties to reach their own agreement. These stan-
dards give meaning to this definition of mediation.
JOINT STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS Preface (1994). Further:
The primary purpose of mediation is to facilitate the parties' voluntary
agreement. This role differs substantially from other professional-cli-
ent relationships. Mixing the role of a mediator and the role of a
professional advising a client is problematic and mediators must strive
to distinguish between the roles. A mediator should therefore refrain
from providing professional advice. Where appropriate, a mediator
should recommend that the parties seek outside professional advice,
or consider resolving the dispute through arbitration, counseling,
neutral evaluation, or other processes. A mediator who undertakes, at
the request of the parties, an additional dispute resolution role in the
same matter assumes increased responsibilities and obligations that
may be governed by the standards of other professions.
Id. Standard VI cmt.
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ators.'143 Yet while the Joint Standards encourage a facilitative
approach to mediation, 144 they do not prohibit evaluation out-
right. 45 Rather, they caution mediators to "refrain from provid-
ing professional advice ,' 146 emphasizing the importance of self-
determination.
Dean Feerick cautioned that mediators who evaluate need to
recognize that in doing so they take on increased obligations and
responsibilities which may make them answerable to other stan-
dards of professional conduct. 14 7 This may well include responsi-
bilities under the lawyer codes of ethics or state statutes or rules
regarding the unauthorized practice of law.148 Thus to Dean
Feerick and the other drafters of the Joint Standards, lawyer-
mediators who adopt evaluative approaches should take heed.
Regardless of any disclaimers a lawyer-mediator may provide
about not serving as either parties' lawyer, the mediator starts
down the slippery slope of practicing law, accountability, and lia-
bility149 once he or she starts to provide legal information and
advice.15 ° This warning echos the concerns Professors Kovach,
Love, and Menkel-Meadow, among others, who likewise argue
143. See supra note 141.
144. See supra note 142.
145. See Symposium, supra note 9 (comments of John Feerick).
146. Feerick, supra note 78, at 482.
147. See id. at 472 n.74.
148. See id. at 473 n.75. Feerick gives examples of statutes which author-
ize non-lawyer judges, and also notes that Rule 2.2 of the ABA Model Rules does
not necessarily regulate lawyer-mediators.
149. Many states provide for mediator immunity unless one can establish
willful mediator misconduct. See generally ROGERS & McEWEN, supra note 6, at §
11:03. The Draft Uniform Mediation Act, however, expressly denies mediators
immunity from civil suit. See National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws, American Bar Association Section on Dispute Resolution, Draft
Uniform Mediation Act, March 1999 at § 4(b) [hereinafter Draft Uniform Mediation
Act] (visited Dec. 18, 1999) <http://www.stanford.edu/group/sccn/media-
tion/>. The Reporter's Working Notes explain that "[m]ediators are not
licensed, so the only means to hold them accountable outside the program
supervised by courts or public agencies is to preserve the possibility of civil lia-
bility." Id. The reporter notes that, to date, "there are no reported cases in
which a mediator has been held liable despite tacit and sometimes explicit
authority for such legal claims." Id.; see also Arthur A. Chaykin, The Liabilities and
Immunities of Mediators: A Hostile Environment for Model Legislation, 2 OHIo ST. J.
ON Disp. RESOL. 47 (1986); Arthur A. Chaykin, Mediator Liability: A New Role for
Fiduciary Duties?, 53 U. CIN. L. Rv. 731(1984).
150. Providing legal information is generally allowed, and legal advice is
not. See Robert B. Moberly, Ethical Standards for Court-Appointed Mediators and
Florida's Mandatory Mediation Experiment, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 701, 714 (1994).
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that evaluative mediation necessarily constitutes the practice of
law. 15
1
At least two states have adopted the joint Standards.152 The
state of Florida, while not one of the Joint Standards states, has
enacted one of the most comprehensive sets of rules for certified
and court-appointed mediators. 5 ' The Florida scheme begins
with a statutory definition of mediation, 54 supplemented by
court rules that further define the process,1 55 sets forth ethical
151. See Kovach & Love, Mapping Mediation, supra note 15, at 104-05
("evaluation of likely court outcomes is the practice of law"); Menkel-Meadow,
Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution, supra note 11, at 425 (concluding that
providing legal information and advice is the practice of law); Menkel-Meadow,
Is Mediation the Practice of Law?, supra note 11. However, Meyerson writes:
Assuming that mediators clarify with parties that no attorney-client
relationship exists, engaging in a legal discussion would not be the
practice of law. Specifically, in order for a mediator's conduct in advis-
ing parties about the legal aspects of a particular dispute to be consid-
ered the practice of law, the party to the mediation must view the
mediator as her lawyer and assume that she is receiving legal advice
for her personal benefit.
Meyerson, supra note 108, at 75.
152. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 4107 (1998) (incorporating by reference
the Joint Standards for all approved registered mediators in Louisiana); S.C.
MEDIATION R. app. A (1998) (adopting almost verbatim the Joint Standards;
only deleting one sentence under Standard I). Both Louisiana and South Caro-
lina have lawyer-only mediation rules. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 4106(A)(1)
(1998); S.C. MEDIATION R. 10(a) (1998).
153. See FLA. R. FOR CERTIFIED & COURT-APPOINTED MEDIATORS Rules
10.100-10.900 (effective Apr. 1, 2000). Florida also has a lawyer-only rule for
circuit court mediators. See id. 10.100(c). The Florida Supreme Court Standing
Committee on Mediation and Arbitration Rules recently completed a two-year
review of the ethical standards for mediators. The Florida Supreme Court
amended the Florida Rules for Certified and Court-Appointed Mediators which
become effective April 1, 2000. Much of the debate in Florida centered on the
issue of the role of evaluation in mediation.
154. Florida law defines mediation as follows:
"Mediation" means a process whereby a neutral third person called a
mediator acts to encourage and facilitate the resolution of a dispute
between two or more parties. It is an informal and nonadversarial pro-
cess with the objective of helping the disputing parties reach a mutu-
ally acceptable and voluntary agreement. In mediation,
decisionmaking authority rests with the parties. The role of the medi-
ator includes, but is not limited to, assisting the parties in identifying
issues, fostering joint problem solving, and exploring settlement
alternatives.
FL. STAT. ANN. § 44.1011(2) (1997).
155. Mediation Defined. Mediation is a process whereby a neutral
third party acts to encourage and facilitate the resolution of a dispute
without prescribing what it should be. It is an informal and nonadver-
sarial process with the objective of helping the disputing parties reach
a mutually acceptable agreement.
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rules,156 and establishes a grievance procedure. 157 Regarding the
question of evaluation, Florida allows certified and court-
appointed mediators to provide information which the mediator
is "qualified by training or experience to provide."158 In no
event, however, may a mediator offer an opinion or prediction as
to specific court outcomes.
1 5 9
One of the most distinguishing features of the Florida regu-
latory scheme is its express recognition of the ethical issues cre-
ated by cross-professional mediation practice. The State scheme
includes a rule on "Concurrent Standards" which provides,
"Other ethical standards to which a mediator may be profession-
ally bound are not abrogated by these rules. In the course of
performing mediation services, however, these rules prevail over
any conflicting ethical standards to which a mediator may other-
wise be bound."16
Like the drafters of the Joint Standards, the authors of the
Florida mediation program thus understood the peculiar ethical
dilemmas faced by cross-practice mediators. However, the Flor-
ida Concurrent Standards rule provides, in contrast to the Joint
Standards, some solution and guidance, and does not simply
FLA. R. FOR CERTIFIED & COURT-APPoINTED MEDIATORS Rule 10.210 (effective
Apr. 1, 2000).
Mediator's Role. In mediation, decision-making authority rests with
the parties. The role of the mediator includes but is not limited to
assisting the parties in identifying issues, reducing obstacles to com-
munication, maximizing the exploration of alternatives, and helping
the parties reach voluntary agreements.
Id. Rule 10.220.
General Principles. Mediation is based on principles of communica-
tion, negotiation, facilitation, and problem solving that emphasize:
(a) self determination;
(b) the needs and interests of the parties;
(c) fairness;
(d) procedural flexibility;
(d) confidentiality; and
(f) full disclosure.
Id. Rule 10.230.
156. See id. Pt. II (setting forth the Standards for Professional Conduct).
157. See id. Pt. III (providing method of enforcing rules).
158. Id. Rule 10.370(a).
159. See id. Rule 10.370(c) ("A mediator shall not offer a personal or pro-
fessional opinion as to how the court in which the case has been filed will
resolve the dispute."). Professor Bob Moberly, who helped draft an earlier ver-
sion of the rules, explains that the purpose of this rule is to prohibit tactics that
will imply some special knowledge of how a particular judge will rule. See
Moberly, supra note 81, at 674.
160. Id. Rule 10.650.
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acknowledge and warn cross-professional practitioners that they
are bound to abide by multiple sets of ethical rules.
The Joint Standards and comprehensive state programs like
Florida's, while necessary and helpful for the conceptual regula-
tory frameworks they put around the practice of mediation, do
not adequately address the specific ethical problems and issues
encountered by lawyers or other mediators who concurrently are
members of a regulated profession.16' They do not answer the
specific cross-disciplinary questions that arise when mediators are
governed by two potentially conflicting standards simultane-
ously.162 Indeed, they may at times add to the confusion. 63 Law-
yer-mediators thus need a uniform and comprehensive set of
standards that will protect the participants from specific media-
tions while promoting the process of mediation generally, as well
as the practice of law.164
Since the cross-practice of law and mediation is unique to
lawyer-mediators, logic and experience suggest that targeted ethi-
161. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When Dispute Resolution Begets Disputes of
its Own: Conflicts Among Dispute Professionals, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1871, 1912
(1997) ("While the Joint Standards provide a useful starting point for the basic
principles of good mediation .. ., its vague standards do not provide adequate
guidance in particular settings."); Moore, supra note 105, at 720:
None of the standards reviewed provide a comprehensive set of guide-
lines to assist lawyer-mediators in dealing with ethical challenges they
confront on a regular basis .... The attempt in the [Joint Standards]
to provide guidance for lawyer-mediators has not fully resolved the
ethical dilemmas they confront. The practicing lawyer-mediator is still
governed by the Model Rules as well as jurisdictional mediation stan-
dards and court rules which may often be mutually inconsistent.
162. See Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution, supra note
11, at 451-52 (criticizing the Joint Standards as too broad and ambiguous in
precisely those areas where they need to be concrete and specific and arguing
for discretionary, aspirational standards on "alternative justice issues"-"pro-
cess-based ethics" such as real consent, self-determination, and democratic par-
ticipation). Florida's recent rule on current standards tries to provide a simple
answer to a complex set of questions by suggesting the state's ethical standards
of conduct for certified and court-appointed mediators trumps all other profes-
sional rules. While this pre-emptive rule provides a neat, bright-line resolution
to the cross-practice problem, I doubt it will work. The problems that arise in
the cross-practice of law and mediation are too central to both practices to
think that either one can so easily be pushed aside. It is hard to imagine that
state bar counsel or state bar commissioners will defer to another body on the
issue of lawyer misconduct even if it is in a mediation context.
163. See id.
164. See Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution, supra note
11, at 409 (arguing that lawyers in ADR need their own rules because the
"matrix of dilemmas" for lawyers who practice as neutral third parties "are sim-
ply not resolved by currently existing rules of ethics for lawyers and third-party
neutrals").
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cal rules for lawyer-mediators would best be located apart from
umbrella rules applicable to all mediators. Those states that
either have adopted the Joint Standards'65 or, like Florida, that
have enacted their own umbrella standards of conduct for
mediators, 16 6 do not adequately address the concerns that are
peculiar to lawyer-mediators. Moreover, those lawyers who have
assumed the role of a mediator without ever seeking certification
as such are obviously not subject to any umbrella standards. 167
Hence, ethical rules specifically targeting the lawyer-mediator
should either come as stand-alone provisions or be incorporated
into lawyer rules of professional conduct.
IV. TARGETED ETHICAL RULES FOR LAwYER-MEDIATORS
To date, two entities have crafted ethical rules that directly
target lawyer-mediators. One is the CPR-Georgetown Commis-
sion on Ethics and Standards in ADR, which in April 1999
released a draft Proposed Model Rule of Professional Conduct
for the Lawyer as Third Party Neutral.16 The other comes from
the Commonwealth of Virginia in the form of specific provisions,
contained in its new lawyer Rules of Professional Conduct, that
address lawyers as third party neutrals and mediators. Both
amount to laudable regulatory efforts, the best to date in terms
of providing meaningful guidance to states and bar associations
venturing through the cross-practice ethical maze. Each also,
however, has its limitations.
165. See supra note 152.
166. See, e.g., FLA. R. FOR CERTIFIED & COURT-APPOINTED MEDIATORS Rule
10.200-10.690 (2000); GA. ALT. Disp. RESOL. R. app. C, A (1997); IND. ALT. Disp.
RESOL. R. 7 (1998); MASS. SuP. JUD. CT. R. 1:18, 9 (1997); MINN. GEN. R. PRAc-
TICE 114 app. (1997) (see Adam Furlan Gislason, Demystifying ADR Regulation in
Minnesota: The Need for Uniformity and Public Trust in the Twenty-First Century ADR
System, 83 MINN. L. REv. 1839, 1878 n.26 (1999) (noting that Minnesota's ADR
Review Board modeled its Code of Ethics after the Joint Standards, and con-
sulted several other states' and associations' codes of ethics)); OKLA. DISP.
RESOL. R. 12, ch. 37, app. A (1995); OR. ADMIN. R. 718-040-0100 (1999) (see
Imperati, supra note 26 (providing a comparison between the Model Standards
(ABA, AAA, SPIDR), the Oregon Mediation Association's Standards of Media-
tion Practice, the Oregon State Bar's Code of Professional Responsibility, and
the ABA's Model Rules)); TENN. R. Sup. CT. RULE 39, app. A (1994); UTAH R.
COURT-ANNEXED ADR R. 104 (1997).
167. For example, Idaho requires mediators on their court-approved ros-
ter to be lawyers with five years of legal experience. See IDAHO R. Civ. P.
16(k)(13)(A)(i) (1995). The Idaho courts, however, have never adopted a
Code of Professional Conduct for Mediators.
168. See COMMISSION ON ETHICS MODEL RULE, supra note 12 (draft
released in April 1999 with comments welcome until July 15, 1999).
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A. CPR-Georgetown Commission on Ethics
The CPR-Georgetown Commission designed its Proposed
Model Rule of Professional Conduct for the Lawyer as Third
Party Neutral ("Draft Model Rule") to supplement traditional law-
yer rules of professional conduct.169 The Commission recog-
nized that lawyers who serve as third-party neutrals often find
themselves in the dual professional capacities of partisan legal
representatives and impartial neutrals.' 7° Given the very differ-
ent and sometimes conflicting demands of these two roles, the
Commission determined that meaningful ethical rules which
speak directly to the cross-practice legal professional are neces-
sary.17 ' Reasoning that "[w]hen a lawyer serves as a third party
neutral in a capacity governed by multiple sets of ethical stan-
dards, the lawyer must note that the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct govern his/her duties as a lawyer-neutral and that disci-
pline as a lawyer will be governed by the Model Rules," '1 7 2 the
Commission deemed it most appropriate to offer its Draft Model
Rule as a supplement to the already existing rules of professional
conduct for lawyers.
With its model rule, the Commission on Ethics hoped to
clarify the distinct role of the lawyer-mediator while remedying
the inadequacies of the umbrella approach as well as the silence
toward cross-practice issues found in the ABA Model Rules and
the state ethics rules for lawyers. 7 ' The Commission's Draft
Model Rule in the main follows the type of all-inclusive view of
mediation advocated by Riskin and others. Dividing its defini-
tional section into four main categories-"adjudicative," "evalua-
tive," "facilitative," and "hybrid" dispute resolution processes-
the Commission included mediation under both the "evalua-
tive"1 74 and "facilitative" a7 5 categories, each with a similar yet dif-
ferent definition. The Commission noted that mediation is often
169. See id. at 1 n.3 ("The proposed rule is designed to be incorporated in
lawyer ethical codes.").
170. See id. at 2.
171. See id. While confusion may exist for any mediator operating under
multiple ethical codes, the Commission on Ethics only addresses the ethical
obligations of lawyers who serve as third party neutrals. See id. at 1.
172. Id. at 3.
173. See id. at 1 n.2. The Commission on Ethics pointed out that "[t]he
current Model Rules are silent on lawyer roles as third party neutrals, which are
different from the representational functions addressed by the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct and judicial functions governed by the Judicial Code of
Conduct." Id. at 2.
174. Id. at 2. The Commission on Ethics Proposed Model Rule of Profes-
sional Conduct for the Lawyer as Third Party Neutral defines "evaluative media-
tion" as:
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characterized as a wholly facilitative process, 7 6 yet it observed
that "in some forms, . . . the third party neutral may engage in
evaluative tasks."'17 7 Among the types of evaluative activities it
deemed appropriate, the Commission listed: "providing legal
information, helping parties and their counsel assess likely out-
comes and inquiring into the legal and factual strengths and
weaknesses of the problems presented. 178
In addition to listing examples of appropriate forms of eval-
uation, the CPR-Georgetown Commission further restricted the
use of evaluative techniques by emphasizing self-determina-
tion, 1 79 impartiality,'8" competence, 8 ' and the integrity of the
A procedure in which a third party neutral facilitates communications
and negotiations among the parties to effect resolution of the matter
by agreement of the parties. Although often considered a facilitative
process (see below) in which a third party neutral facilitates communi-
cation and party negotiation, in some forms of mediation, the third
party neutral may engage in evaluative tasks, such as providing legal
information, helping parties and their counsel assess likely outcomes
and inquiring into the legal and factual strengths and weaknesses of
the problems presented. By agreement of the parties or applicable
law, mediators may sometimes be called on to act as evaluators or spe-
cial discovery masters, or to perform other third party neutral roles.
Id. at 4.
175. Id. at 2. The Commission on Ethics Proposed Model Rule of Profes-
sional Conduct for the Lawyer as Third Party Neutral defines "facilitative media-
tion" as:
A procedure in which a neutral third party facilitates communication
and negotiations among the parties to seek resolution of issues
between the parties. Mediation is non-binding and does not, unless
otherwise agreed to by the parties, authorize the third party neutral to
evaluate (see above), decide or otherwise offer a judgment on the
issues between the parties. If the mediation concludes in an agree-
ment, that agreement, if it meets otherwise applicable law concerning
the enforceability of contracts, is enforceable as a contractual agree-
ment. Where authorized by applicable law, mediation agreements
achieved during pending litigation may be entered as court
judgments.
Id. at 4. It is interesting to note, however, that Professor Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, chair of the CPR-Georgetown Commission on Ethics and Standards in
ADR, in an earlier article discussing the work of the Commission on Ethics,
listed mediation only under facilitative processes. See Menkel-Meadow, supra
note 110, at 660-62.
176. See COMMISSION ON ETHICS MODEL Rut, supra note 12, at 4.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 4-5.
179. See id. at 5-6 ("While settlement or resolution is the goal of most
ADR processes, the primary responsibility for the resolution of the dispute and
the shaping of a settlement in mediation and evaluation rests with the
parties.").
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mediation process.18 2 Rule 4.5.1 (b), for example, restricts a law-
yer-neutral's conduct by stipulating that the neutral "should
decline to serve in those matters in which the lawyer is not com-
petent to serve."183 Following this, the rule's comment section
adopts a contextual view of competence. It provides:
In determining whether a lawyer-neutral has the requisite
knowledge and skill to serve as a neutral in a particular
matter and process, relevant factors may include: the par-
ties's reasonable expectations regarding the ADR process
and the lawyer-neutral's role, the procedural and substan-
tive complexity of the matter and process, the lawyer-neu-
tral's general ADR experience and training, legal
experience, subject matter expertise, the preparation the
lawyer-neutral is able to give to the matter, and the feasibil-
ity of employing experts or co-neutrals with required sub-
stantive or process expertise. In many instances, a lawyer-
180. See id. at 9 (defining impartiality as "freedom from favoritism or bias
either by word of action, and a commitment to serve the process and all parties
equally.").
181. See id. at 6:
[T]he parties's reasonable expectations regarding the ADR process and
the neutral's role, the procedural and substantive complexity of the
matter and process, the lawyer-neutral's general ADR experience and
training, legal experience, subject matter expertise, the preparation
the lawyer-neutral is able to give to the matter, and the feasibility of
employing experts or co-neutrals with required substantive or process
expertise.
182. See id. at 14. In particular, Rule 4.5.6(d) provides in part, "[tihe
third party neutral should also make reasonable efforts to determine that the
parties have reached agreement of their own volition and knowingly consent to
settlement." Id. Comment 1 provides:
While ethical rules cannot guarantee the specific procedures or fair-
ness of a process, this rule is intended to require third party neutrals
to be attentive to the basic values and goals informing fair dispute res-
olution. These values include party autonomy; party choice of process
(to the extent permitted by law or contract); party choice of and con-
sent to the choice of the third party neutral (to the extent permitted
by law or contract); and fairness of the conduct of the process itself.
This rule is concerned not only with specific harms to particular par-
ticipating parties but with the appearance of the integrity of the pro-
cess to the public and other possible users of these processes.
Id. Comment 2 paraphrases and clarifies subsection (d):
While some have suggested that third party neutrals should bear some
moral accountability or legal responsibility for the agreements they
help facilitate, see Lawrence Susskind, Environmental Mediation and the
Accountability Problem, 9 VT. L. REv. 1 (1981), these Rules do not make
the third party neutral the guarantor of a fair and just result.
Id. at 14-15.
183. Id. at 5.
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neutral may accept a neutral assignment where the requi-
site level of competence can be achieved by reasonable
preparation.184
While thus placing some restrictions on the use of evalua-
tion in mediation, the Commission on Ethics concludes its defi-
nition of evaluative mediation by stating: "By agreement of the
parties, or applicable law, mediators may sometimes be called on
to act as evaluators or special discovery masters, or to perform
other third party neutral roles.""'5 This leaves a huge valley in
the mediation process as it allows the mediator to shift processes
without considering the potential harms that could result. There
is, for example, no assurance that the parties truly understand
the differences in processes. There is also the potential for infor-
mation gathered in caucus being used later for purposes that
were unanticipated at the time. Confidences shared with a non-
decisionmaking mediator may well be regretted should that
mediator later become an evaluator or special master.18 6 Thus,
all the concerns that surround the use of hybrid ADR processes
are left exposed by the Commission on Ethics Draft Model
Rule. 1
87
Thus it is apparent that the Commission on Ethics struggled
with the issue of evaluation and reached a compromise-
acknowledging the existence and role of both facilitative and
evaluative mediation. The Commission on Ethics Model Rule,
however, does not really address the risks associated with evalua-
tion as it relates to impartiality and self-determination nor how
switching roles or processes in mid-stream may impact the
processes. The impartiality section deals primarily with the medi-
ator's ongoing obligations to maintain neutrality,1 8 to disclose
184. Id. at 6.
185. Id.
186. See John W. Cooley, Mediation Magic: Its Use and Abuse, 29 Lov. U.
CHI. L.J. 1 (1997) (discussing the role of deception in mediation, exposing the
types of deceptions mediators and mediation advocates use in mediation, and
calling for the legal community to clarify the ethical rules regarding truthful-
ness standards in the context of mediation and negotiations).
187. See, e.g.,Julie Brienza, ADR Doing Two Things at Once Can Be Problem-
atic, 34 TIUAL 19 (1998); Robert B. Fitzpatrick, Shouldn't We Make Full Disclo-
sure to Our Clients of ADR Options?, 59 ALI-ABA 755, 769-70 (1998); but see
Sherry Landry, Med-Arb: Mediation With A Bite and an Effective ADR Model, 63
DEF. COUNS. J. 263, 264-69 (discussing the pros and cons of med-arb and con-
cluding that it effectively combines the best of arbitration and mediation).
188. See COMMISSION ON ETHICS MODEL RULE, supra note 12, at 9:
(a) A lawyer who serves as a third party neutral should be impartial
with respect to the issues and the parties in the matter;
(1) A lawyer who serves as a third party neutral should conduct all
proceedings in an impartial, unbiased and evenhanded manner,
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the potential for bias, and to avoid conflicts of interest. 189 The
rules briefly address the right of the parties to formulate their
own solutions,1 90 though it provides little guidance as to how pre-
dictions by the mediator may interfere with the parties' self-
determination. The rules also fail to adequately define or differ-
entiate between legal information and legal advice. While some
of these deficiencies may be clarified in later versions, it appears
as if the Commission has adopted a very expansive view of media-
tion without providing sufficient guidance on the downsides of
evaluation or how allowing third party neutrals to switch
processes may impact the process. This view is based on the very
questionable assumption that consumers are sophisticated and
can understand and evaluate the distinctions.
B. Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct
Like the CPR-Georgetown Commission with its Draft Model
Rule, the Commonwealth of Virginia has set out to devise rules of
professional conduct that directly target those engaged in the
cross-practice of law and mediation. In Spring 1999, the Virginia
Supreme Court approved new Virginia Rules of Professional
Conduct for the legal profession. These rules, which take effect
on January 1, 2000, are part of an elaborate ADR regulatory
scheme. Virginia addresses mediation in its statutes ("Code of
Virginia"),191 its Standards of Ethics for Court-Certified
Mediators,'9 2 its Guidelines for the Training and Certification of
Court-Referred Mediators, 193 and most recently in Guidelines on
Mediation and the Unauthorized Practice of Law.19 4
treating all parties with fairness and respect. If at any time the
lawyer is unable to conduct the process in an impartial manner,
the lawyer shall withdraw, unless prohibited from doing so by
applicable law.
189. See supra note 180.
190. See supra notes 179, 182.
191. See infra notes 195-200 and accompanying text.
192. STANDARDS OF ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR CERTI-
FIED MEDIATORS (adopted by the Judicial Council of Virginia, October 1997).
193. These were recendy amended and became effective January 1, 2000.
194. GUIDELINES ON MEDIATION AND THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW
(1999) [hereinafter GUIDELINES ON MED. & UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE]. The
Department of Dispute Resolution Services of the Supreme Court of Virginia
created a committee which surveyed the various states on the problems of UPL
and mediation. They determined the following:
At a minimum, a mediator provides legal advice whenever, in the
mediation context, he or she applies legal principles to facts in a man-
ner that (1) in effect predicts a specific resolution of a legal issue or
(2) directs, counsels, urges, or recommends a course of action by a
disputant or disputants as a means of resolving a legal issue.
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By statute, Virginia defines mediation, 5 describes confiden-
tiality in the mediation process,19 6 and establishes civil immunity
for mediators.197 Section 8.01-576.9 of the State Code describes
the ethical standards of neutrals, prohibiting a mediator or other
neutral from compelling or coercing the parties into entering
into an agreement, and requiring them to remain impartial and
free from conflicts of interest. 9 8 Section 8.01-576.5 allows a
court to refer any contested civil matter or selected issues in a
civil case to a dispute resolution evaluation session.'99 Pursuant
to sections 8.01-576.12, a court may vacate an agreement for vari-
ous reasons, including misconduct on the part of the neutral.2 ° °
Most significantly and novel, however, is the targeted regulation
of lawyer-mediators found in the new Rules of Professional Con-
duct. These rules include provisions that expressly cover lawyers
acting as third party neutrals 201 and as lawyer-mediators, 20 2 as
well as a requirement that lawyers advise their clients about avail-
able dispute resolution processes. 20 3
Id. at 13.
195. See VA. CODE § 8.01-576.4 (1999).
196. See id. § 8.01-576.9.
197. See id. § 8.01-581.23.
198. See id. § 8.01-576.9.
199. See id. § 8.01-576.5.
200. See id § 8.01-576.12:
[Defining "misconduct" as including] the failure of the neutral to
inform the parties in writing at the commencement of the mediation
process that: (i) the neutral does not provide legal advice, (ii) any
mediated agreement will affect legal rights of the parties, (iii) each
party to the mediation has the opportunity to consult with independ-
ent legal counsel at any time and is encouraged to do so, and (iv) each
party to the mediation should have any draft agreement reviewed by
independent counsel prior to signing the agreement or should waive
his opportunity to do so.
201. SeeVIRGINIA RuLEs PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.10 cmt. 1 (1999)
(defining dispute resolution proceedings conducted by a third party neutral as
including mediation, conciliation, early neutral evaluation, non-binding arbitra-
tion and non-judicial settlement conferences).
202. See id. Rule 2.11.
203. See id.; id. Rule 1.2 cmt. 1 ("a client has a right to consult with the
lawyer about the means to be used in pursuing those objectives. In that con-
text, a lawyer shall advise the client about the advantages, disadvantages, and
availability of dispute resolution processes that might be appropriate in pursu-
ing these objectives"); id. Rule 1.4 cmt. 1(a):
This continuing duty to keep the client informed includes a duty to
advise the client about the availability of dispute resolution processes
that might be more appropriate to the client's goals than the initial
process chosen. For example, information obtained during a lawyer-
to-lawyer negotiation may give rise to consideration of a process, such
20001
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The Virginia rules are significant not only because they
mark the first attempt by a state to specifically address the prac-
tice of mediation by lawyers, but also because they confront head-
on the divisive issue of evaluation.2" 4 The drafters of the Virginia
rules thoroughly debated the issue of evaluation, striving to
resolve it through what they termed a "delicate compromise. "205
The drafters wanted to provide guidelines or boundaries without
tying the hands of mediation practitioners. 20 6 Viewing media-
tion as an evolving profession that requires flexibility, 20 7 they
rejected any attempt at a hard and fast definition of the prac-
208tice, suggesting instead that while facilitation lies at the core of
mediation, 20 9 the practice allows for a good measure of evalua-
tive activity.
Like the CPR-Georgetown Commission, therefore, Virginia's
"delicate compromise" amounts to a pragmatic approach to the
issue of evaluation. Acknowledging that many parties do want
evaluation and that many lawyer-mediators give them what they
want, Virginia recognizes both the facilitative and evaluative
as mediation, where the parties themselves could be more directly
involved in resolving the dispute.
204. See id. Rule 2.11 (characterizing evaluation as looking at the
strengths and weaknesses of positions, assessing the value and cost of alterna-
tives to settlement or assessing the barriers to settlement).
205. Carl T. Hahn, Using Evaluative Techniques: The Virginia Approach, 16
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST Lrric. 149 (1998).
206. See Notes from a conversation with Barbara Hulburt, Co-chair of the
Joint Committee on ADR for Virginia (on file with author) [hereinafter
Hulbert].
207. See id.
208. Similarly the Draft Uniform Mediation Act does not distinguish
among styles or approaches to mediation but the drafters substituted the word
"facilitated" for "conduct" in the definition of "mediator" to emphasize that the
mediator has no authority to decide the dispute. Draft Uniform Mediation Act,
supra note 149, at 10. The Reporter's Working Notes for Draft Uniform Media-
tion Act also discuss some of the considerations which went into finding a defi-
nition of mediation:
A definition of mediation could be drafted to exclude related
processes that are not the type of mediation contemplated by the
Drafters. However, to narrow the definition to purely facilitative medi-
ation could lead to attempts to thwart the privilege if the mediator
gave an opinion concerning the likely outcome if the parties did not
settle, and carries potential for abuse. The Draft definitions provide
only two distinguishing factors (1) a mediator not aligned with a dis-
putant and (2) assistance is through negotiation.
Id.
209. See VIRGINIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.11(a) (1999)
("A lawyer-mediator is a third party neutral .. . who facilitates communication
between the parties and, without deciding the issues or imposing a solution on
the parties, enables them to understand and resolve their dispute.").
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mediation styles.21° Unlike the CPR-Georgetown Commission,
however, Virginia does not simply recognize both styles, but gives
a decided preference to the facilitative mode while identifying
and addressing the pitfalls associated with evaluations.
Virginia thus places "restrictions on evaluative techniques
designed to protect the essential, facilitative purpose of the medi-
ation process."21  These restrictions proscribe that any evaluative
activity be "incidental to the facilitative role" and not "interfere
with the lawyer-mediator's impartiality or the self-determination
of the parties."2 2 Yet while Virginia discusses the role and high-
lights the dangers of evaluation, it does not define the term.
After much debate, the drafters of the State rules decided that
"[d] efining mediation to exclude an evaluative approach is diffi-
cult not only because practice varies but because no consensus
exists as to what constitutes an evaluation. ' 213 Nonetheless, they
did attempt to place certain parameters around evaluation.21 4
Virginia Rule of Professional Conduct 2.11 (d) contains descrip-
tive language of evaluation, 215 and the comment explains that
lawyer-mediators are prohibited from offering any of the parties
legal advice (noting that this is a function of the lawyer who is
representing a client) 216 or from using coercive techniques.217
The rule does authorize lawyer-mediators to give legal informa-
210. See supra notes 21-33 and accompanying text.
211. Hahn, supra note 205, at 149.
212. VIRGINIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.11(d) (1999).
213. Id. Rule 2.11 cmt. 2.
214. When asked whether lawyer-mediators in Virginia could give out-
come predictions, Barbara Hulburt believed that the new rules of Professional
Conduct allowed a broad brush approach without giving a specific prediction.
See Hulbert, supra note 206.
215. See VIRGINIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.11(d) (1999).
216. See id. Rule 2.11 cmL. 7. All certified mediators in Virginia are fur-
ther prohibited from dispensing legal advice by the State ethics standards for
mediators. See VIRGINIA STANDARDS OF ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
FOR CERTIFIED MEDIATORS (adopted by the Judicial Council of Virginia, Oct.
1997). Virginia has taken a more aggressive stance than most states in regulat-
ing mediator competence and ensuring credentialing. Certified circuit court
civil mediators must have a four year degree, forty hours of training, two obser-
vations, supervised co-mediation for at least ten hours, and evaluation and rec-
ommendation by a certified mentor. They must also agree to abide by the
Virginia Standards of Ethics and Professional Responsibility for Certified
Mediators. Mediators must be recertified every two years: Recertification for
circuit court civil mediators requires having performed a minimum of five com-
plete cases or fifteen hours of mediation over the certification period, submittal
of performance evaluations, and completion of at least eight hours of addi-
tional training or education, two hours of which must be in mediation ethics.
See id.
217. See VIRGINIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.11 cmt. 8:
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tion,218 on the ground that doing so "is an educational function
which aids the parties in making informed decisions."2 19 The
rule also premises the dispensing of legal information on the
notion of "informed consent," resulting in an approach that
ensures that the principle of self-determination is not compro-
mised by the parties' decision to adopt a more evaluative media-
tion style. 2
20
Prior to commencing a mediation, lawyer-mediators in Vir-
ginia must discuss with prospective parties the general nature of
mediation. 22 1 They must divulge their personal style, approach,
and subject-matter expertise, 22 2 while eliciting the parties' expec-
The lawyer-mediator shall not, however, make decisions for any party
to the mediation process nor shall the lawyer-mediator use a neutral
evaluation to coerce or influence the parties to settle their dispute or
to accept a particular solution to their dispute or to accept a particular
solution to their dispute.... [The rule] restrict[s] the use of evalua-
tive techniques by the lawyer-mediator to situations where the parties
have given their informed consent to the use of such techniques and
where a neutral evaluation will assist, rather than interfere with the
ability of the parties to reach a mutually agreeable solution to their
dispute.
See also Nolan-Haley, supra note 8, at 812-40 (describing her theory of true
informed consent and integrating it into mediation practice).
218. See VIRGINIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.11(c) (1999)
("A lawyer-mediator may offer legal information if all parties are present or
separately to the parties if they consent.").
219. Id. Rule 2.11 cmt. 7.
220. See id. Rule 2.11 cmts. 7, 8. See also Hahn, supra note 205; Nolan-
Haley, supra note 8, at 812:
A robust theory of informed consent requires that parties be educated
about mediation before they consent to participate in it, that their
continued participation and negotiations be voluntary, and that they
understand the outcomes to which they agree. Informed consent
serves the values of autonomy, human dignity, and efficiency. It
guards against coercion, ignorance, and incapacity that can impede
the consensual underpinnings of the mediation process. But to say
this is just the beginning of the inquiry. A theory of informed consent
for mediation must take into account not only the relationship
between the principle of informed consent and the values it serves,
but how this principle should operate in the parties' decisionmaking
acts, the practices which foster it, and its limitations.
221. See VIRGINIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.11(e) (1) (i)
(1999).
222. See id. Rule 2.11(e) (1) (iii). The requirement of informing prospec-
tive parties of their subject-matter expertise creates a potential conflict with
Model Rule 7.4, which prohibits a lawyer from claiming to be a "specialist" in
any area of law except for patent law, admiralty, or upon special certification by
an appropriate regulatory authority or organization.
PRESERVING THE INTEGRITY OF MEDIATION
tations about the mediation process."' Furthermore, they must
explain the limitations that are inherent in the use of evalua-
tion. Under Rule 2.11 (d), evaluation may play only a support-
ive, secondary role:
A lawyer-mediator may offer evaluation of, for example,
strengths and weaknesses of positions, assess the value and
cost of alternatives to settlement or assess the barriers to
settlement (collectively referred to as evaluation) only if
such evaluation is incidental to the facilitative role and
does not interfere with the lawyer-mediator's impartiality
or the self-determination of the parties.
225
The parties' expectations and understandings must be memorial-
ized in writing in the agreement to mediate. 226 The rule ends
emphasizing party choice-"A lawyer-mediator shall conduct the
mediation in a manner that is consistent with the parties' choice
and expectations.
227
The comment section to the Virginia rule further stresses
disclosure and the importance of the parties' full understanding
as to the risks associated with evaluation. Comment 3 stipulates
that: "If the parties request an evaluative approach, the lawyer-
mediator shall explain the risk that evaluation might interfere
with mediator impartiality and party self-determination. 228
Moreover, before actually giving an evaluation or engaging in
evaluative techniques, comment 4 instructs the lawyer-mediator
to consult with the parties and independently consider whether
the evaluation is appropriate under the circumstances, especially
as to whether it presents a threat to the mediator's impartiality or
the ability of the parties to retain control over fashioning their
own agreement.2 29 The mediator must also assess whether the
evaluation contemplated appears likely to detract from the par-
223. See id. Rule 2.11(e)(1)(iv). This is consistent with Sam Imperati's
recommendation that a code encourages the parties to pick the mediation
model that works for them. See Imperati, supra note 26, at 743.
224. See VIRGINIA RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 2.11(e) (1) (ii)
(1999).
225. Id. Rule 2.11(d).
226. See id. Rule 2.11(e) (2); Nolan-Haley, supra note 8, at 828 (arguing
that "a contractual approach to informed consent gives parties a great deal of
freedom in structuring their own decisionmaking process, and it may be helpful
in resolving some of the difficult problems affecting mediation practice today").
227. VIRGINIA RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.11(f) (1999).
228. Id. Rule 2.11 cmt. 3.
229. See id. Rule 2.11 cmt. 4.
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ties' willingness to participate openly and meaningfully in the
mediation process.23
Thus, Virginia clearly does not prohibit outright the use of
evaluative techniques in mediation. Nor does the State require,
as has been urged by Professors Kovach and Love, that each gen-
eral approach to mediation be labeled as a distinct process. Yet
the Virginia program places unprecedented hurdles in the path
of evaluation. Mediators in Virginia must inform all parties to a
mediation that evaluative techniques have significant drawbacks
and will only be used if requested by all sides.231 The Virginia
rules further ensure that evaluation will be employed sparingly
and always as a supplement to the facilitative process, never as
the primary orientation. In these respects, the Virginia rules
mark a significant development in the ethical regulation of medi-
ation practice. They are principled in their support of the classi-
cal conception of mediation as a facilitative process, yet
pragmatic in structure. Virginia seeks to resolve the facilitative/
evaluative dilemma, that is, by noting the pitfalls of evaluation
and curtailing its proliferation while acknowledging the realities
of practice-that numerous parties want and many lawyer-
mediators give evaluations.232 In the words of one of the rule's
drafters: "[I]n the view of most of the committee, mediation
encompasses a wide range of techniques. As a result, to impose
in ethical rules a definition of mediation as a pure facilitative
process would create the potential for unfair ethical traps for
unwary parties and mediators."
23 3
Yet despite the creative nature of the new Virginia rules, seri-
ous questions surround how they will be received by the media-
tion and legal communities. Questions of implementation and
work ability also exist. Briefly, I want to highlight three concerns
that suggest that the Virginia solution to the evaluative/facilita-
tive debate may be less than fully satisfactory.
230. See id. (requiring a mediator to consider "whether an evaluation
could detract from the willingness of the parties to work at understanding their
own and each other's situation and at considering a broader range of interests,
issues and options").
231. See VIRGINIA STANDARDS OF ETHics AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
FOR CERTIFIED MEDIATORS D.2.c (1997) (encouraging neutral third parties to
properly label mixed processes "[i]f the mediation is conducted in conjunction
with another dispute resolution process, such as arbitration, and the same neu-
tral conducts both processes, the mediator must describe to the parties the pro-
cedures to be followed in both processes clearly, prior to entering into the
agreement to mediate").
232. See supra note 27.
233. Hahn, supra note 205, at 149.
PRESERVING THE INTEGRITY OF MEDIATION
First, and most fundamentally, Virginia does not resolve the
question, What is mediation? By not following the requests of
Kovach and Love to clearly label all directive methods as forms of
ADR distinct from mediation, Virginia does little to quell the
debate over whether evaluation can appropriately be considered
a type or technique of mediation practice. The decided prefer-
ence Virginia gives to facilitation is. clear; yet the accommodation
it provides those mediators with evaluative orientations makes its
overall contribution to the definitional debate far less so.
Second, while the Virginia rules make a laudable effort at
listing allowable forms of evaluation, interpretation of these
forms may prove to be controversial. For example, the Virginia
rules do not define "legal advice," which is prohibited, or "legal
information," which is not. While prohibiting one and allowing
the other suggests that it is possible to distinguish clearly between
them, a good deal of academic literature suggests that such a dis-
tinction is not readily forthcoming.234 Virginia is likely to find,
though, that it will need to hazard some clarification. The pro-
posed Guidelines on Mediation and the Unauthorized Practice
of Law make an effort in this regard2 '-"A mediator may not
make specific predictions about the resolution of legal issues or
direct the decision-making of any party"-though the Guidelines
themselves will likely come under severe attack, particularly by
mediators who operate from a strong evaluative orientation.
Finally, questions surround the workability of the State's
"informed consent" requirement. The firm demand set forth in
the Virginia rules that a mediator secure in writing the informed
consent of all parties before commencing any evaluative activities
is one of the program's hallmarks.236 Mediators must discuss
234. See, e.g., ROGERS & McEwEN, supra note 6, at § 10.02 (detailing a
number of opinions on the difference between legal. advice and information);
supra note 19.
235. See GUIDELINES ON MED. & UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE, supra note 194
(providing examples of what constitutes legal advice and finding that a media-
tor may "provide legal resources and procedural information to disputants,"
"make statements declarative of the law," "ask reality-testing questions that raise
legal issues," "inform the disputing parties about the mediator's experiences
with a particular court or type of case," and "inform the disputing parties about
the enforceability of a mediated agreement." "A mediator may not make spe-
cific predictions about the resolution of legal issues or direct the decision-mak-
ing of any party.").
236. See VIRGINIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.11 (e)(2)
(1999) (requiring the lawyer-mediator, prior to the mediation session, to "enter
into agreement to mediate which references the choice and expectations of the
parties, including whether the parties have chosen, permit or expect the use of
neutral evaluation or evaluative techniques during the course of the media-
tion"); id. cmt. 3 ("Following [the initial consultation] the lawyer-mediator and
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mediation approaches with the parties and caution them about
the potential problems associated with evaluative techniques. 37
This requirement adds a valuable dimension to the Virginia regu-
latory scheme, for it curtails the mediator's power by ensuring
that the parties are not taken unawares by a shift in orientation
in a mediation.238 Yet how informed is informed consent? It
belies experience to think that most parties to a mediation will
understand readily the differences between mediation styles,
especially when they learn of them in the charged atmosphere of
an ongoing process. Academics and practicing mediators find it
difficult to agree where evaluation begins or when party self-
determination has been compromised. We can hardly expect
the parties to gain a full understanding the first time of a process
that so befuddles its own practitioners.
CONCLUSION
Ethical rules that target lawyer-mediators, such as those
included in the new Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct, thus
offer no panacea, though they do signify an important step in the
regulation of mediation practice. Such regulatory developments
are critical, for the proliferation of activist, evaluative techniques
in mediation jeopardizes the very continued existence of media-
tion as a practice separate and distinct from law and other ADR
processes.
I do not mean to suggest that evaluation should be prohib-
ited; nor, in fact, do I regard all evaluative or directive tech-
niques as "bad." In many situations, a third party neutral with an
evaluative orientation will be more effective and more to the par-
ties' liking than a strictly facilitative neutral. Only the "activist,"
directive evaluator is not a mediator, at least not in the tradi-
tional sense. And while tradition alone may not be a good rea-
son to try curbing the evaluative movement in mediation
practice, neither is the factual premise that evaluation is what
many mediators do a sound reason for letting the movement
grow unhindered. I am reminded of the introduction of kudzu
the parties shall sign a written agreement to mediate which reflects the choice
and expectations of the parties.").
237. See supra note 227.
238. See Nolan-Haley, supra note 8, at 778:
[Arguing that informed consent] serves as a check on the mediator's
power, a way of making sure that the mediator has not used her posi-
tion to cajole or bamboozle parties into consent. In short, informed
consent matters because the potential for coercion, incapacity, and
ignorance can impede the consensual underpinnings of the media-
tion process.
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in the Southern states during the first part of the twentieth cen-
tury. Brought in from Asia to curtail erosion, the hairy kudzu
vines have taken over much of the rural landscape. Likewise,
importing evaluative techniques into the traditionally facilitative
process of mediation may well lead to those techniques coming
to dominate the process, contributing to the demise of media-
tion as a facilitative process. It would be tragic to lose one of the
real alternatives to the adversarial process. While some argue
that it is too late to rein in evaluative techniques, I disagree. That
is precisely what we must do. Along with Professor Menkel-
Meadow,2"9 I believe that the continued success of mediation
requires us to regulate the profession, especially those involved
in the cross-practice of law and mediation.
The focus of the debate about whether evaluation properly
constitutes a form of mediation should be directed, explicitly and
narrowly, toward the two basic premises of mediation: partici-
pant self-determination and mediator impartiality. Some, but
not all, evaluative mediation styles do interfere with one or both
of these two basic tenets. Yet no sharp boundary or definition of
mediation can be expected to delineate with certainty when a
mediator's conduct exceeds the proper scope of mediation prac-
tice. The sole question that helps is whether the mediator's con-
duct gives him or her power and control over the outcome of the
mediation. For once a third party neutral advocates that the par-
ties see the dispute in a particular light, that light becomes the
beacon that directs the pathway through the remainder of the
mediation, compromising both the parties' self-determination
and the mediator's impartiality.
If the mediator becomes the central character and the party
who truly determines the outcome, then the dispute resolution
process at issue is no longer mediation but something much
more akin to settlement conferencing. Just because the neutral
calls it mediation doesn't make it so. Imprecise usage of lan-
guage cannot be allowed to define the process. We err, and we
disserve the entire spectrum of ADR processes, if we come to view
the whole spectrum as merely mediation in a variety of forms and
orientations.
Labeling ADR processes enhances informed consent. A
sound dispute resolution program must include assurances that
the parties involved in each matter share a common understand-
ing about the nature of the process they are purchasing. Label-
239. See Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution, supra note
11, at 418 (arguing that the success of mediation now requires us to regulate it).
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ing the process and clearly communicating its parameters to the
parties helps ensure mutual understanding.
Finally, we must acknowledge that as mediation becomes
more and more commonplace, and the parties to mediations
and their lawyers increasingly sophisticated about the process,
evaluative techniques may well come back to haunt the unwary
mediator who finds him or herself prey to the skilled lawyer or
astute party. An experienced litigator who regularly refers and
represents his clients in mediations not long ago confided in me
that he plays "spin the mediator" whenever a mediator begins to
exhibit directive, evaluative tendencies. His game of spinning
the mediator has as its goal convincing the evaluative mediator of
the correctness of his client's position, and then sitting back as
the mediator advocates on his client's behalf. So much for
impartiality!
Without close scrutiny and the enactment of meaningful
ethical rules for those engaged in the cross-practice of law and
mediation, evaluation thus not only threatens the continued
existence of mediation as a separate form of dispute resolution,
but brings into question the very fairness of using mediation as
an alternative to litigation. For if skilled litigators come to treat
mediation as a tool they can manipulate, and evaluative
mediators as neutrals easily duped into becoming unknowing
advocates, any thought that mediation is a forum for the just res-
olution of disputes becomes mere illusion and pretense.
